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Introduction
This thesis investigates the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy, with a focus on austerity
(or public-sector deleveraging), and private-sector deleveraging. It highlights the pivotal
role of nonlinearities in generating different outcomes depending on the sign of the fiscal
adjustment and how these nonlinearities shape the interaction between public and private
deleveraging. In the following, I provide a short summary of the main findings of each
chapter.
Chapter 1 is based on joint work with Benjamin Born, Gernot Mu¨ller, and Johannes
Pfeifer. Under fixed exchange rates, fiscal policy is an effective tool. According to classical
views because it impacts the real exchange rate, according to Keynesian views because it
impacts output. Both views have merit because the effects of government spending are
asymmetric. A spending cut lowers output but does not alter the real exchange rate. A
spending increase appreciates the exchange rate but does not alter output unless there is
economic slack. We establish these results in a small open economy model with downward
nominal wage rigidity and provide empirical evidence on the basis of quarterly time-series
data for 38 countries.
Chapter 2 takes a closer look at the Greek experience during the Great Contraction.
Greece stands out as having the sharpest decline in GDP and government spending in
Europe over the 2010-14 period. The aim of this paper is to assess the macroeconomic
effects of public deleveraging, defined as government spending below forecast, and private
deleveraging. The former mostly accounts for the output loss experienced by the country.
However, the joint occurrence of public and private deleveraging generates quantitatively
relevant nonlinear effects.
Chapter 3 critically reviews the literature assessing the individual and joint effects of
public and private deleveraging. The amplification mechanism set in motion by their joint
occurrence is likely to be quantitatively relevant. However, there is still limited evidence
– 1 –
about the real extent of such interaction.
I hope the findings of this thesis can make policy makers in the euro area aware of the
nontrivial consequences of their fiscal decisions.
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Chapter 1
The worst of both worlds: fiscal policy and fixed
exchange rates
Joint with Benjamin Born, Gernot Mu¨ller, and Johannes Pfeifer
1.1 Introduction
In theory, fiscal policy is a powerful stabilization tool in open economies when the
exchange rate is fixed. Keynesian theories in the tradition of the Mundell-Fleming model
emphasize that changes of government spending impact output strongly because prices
and wages, and eventually the real exchange rate, are slow to adjust (Corsetti et al.,
2013a; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2014; Farhi and Werning, 2016). Raising public spending
stimulates output, while reducing it is detrimental to economic activity. In contrast, in
classical theories the adjustment of the real exchange rate takes center stage (Corsetti and
Mu¨ller, 2006). Raising spending does not stimulate output much because the exchange rate
appreciates, while reducing it restores competitiveness (Sinn, 2014).
Both views seem to have some merit in light of the facts. Figure 1.1 shows data for
individual countries in the euro area, distinguishing between two periods. In the left
panel we measure, for the period from the introduction of the euro up until the end of
2007, the cumulative change in government spending on the horizontal axis. By and large
it was a period of fiscal expansion. The vertical axis measures the change in the real
effective exchange rate during that period. A decrease of the exchange rate corresponds to
an appreciation. We observe that higher spending is associated with a sizable exchange
rate appreciation—consistent with the classical view. In the right panel, we zoom in on
the austerity period 2010–2015. While most countries experienced sizable spending cuts,
exchange rates hardly moved—in line with the Keynesian view.
Can both views be correct? Recently, Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2016) have put forward
a new paradigm for thinking about macroeconomic adjustment in open economies. Its
– 3 –
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key feature is downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR).1 A direct implication is that
economies with an exchange-rate peg adjust asymmetrically to shocks. Expansionary shocks
are largely absorbed by rising wages. The exchange rate appreciates. Contractionary shocks,
instead, are absorbed by falling output. The exchange rate adjusts only sluggishly. In the
first part of this paper, we formalize this idea for government spending, which we introduce
in the original model of Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2016). In the second part of the paper,
we provide supporting evidence based on a large panel data set. It includes quarterly
observations for 38 countries since the early 1990s, both within and outside of the euro area.
The main result of our analysis—both in terms of theory and evidence—is that the
effects of government spending shocks are indeed asymmetric under an exchange-rate peg.
In response to a negative government spending shock, the real exchange rate does not adjust
in the short run. In line with the Keynesian view, downward nominal wage rigidity prevents
the adjustment. At the same time, output and employment fall sharply. In response to a
positive government spending shock, instead, the exchange rate appreciates. In line with the
classical view, higher demand pushes up wages and prices. Private expenditure is crowded
out such that output and employment remain unchanged. In sum, the world appears to
be neither purely Keynesian nor purely classical. Rather, as far as fiscal stabilization is
concerned, we live in the worst of both worlds.
Our model-based analysis builds on Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2016). We extend the
original two-sector model as we allow explicitly for government spending. Specifically, we
assume that the government consumes an exogenously determined amount of nontraded
goods. In order to finance these purchases, the government levies lump-sum taxes so that its
budget is balanced at all times. Our first contribution is to flesh out the fiscal transmission
mechanism in the model. For this purpose, we contrast the case of an exchange-rate peg
and the case of flexible exchange rates. As a natural benchmark, we consider a float where
the exchange rate adjusts in such a way as to offset the effect of DNWR altogether. In this
case, output is always stabilized at the efficient level.
Under a float, the real exchange rate responds symmetrically to government spending
shocks. A positive shock, that is, a spending increase, appreciates the real exchange
rate because it raises the relative price of nontraded goods. This, in turn, crowds out
1For recent discussions on the empirical prevalence of DNWR, see Jo (2018) and Elsby and Solon (2019)
and references therein. See also Knoppik and Beissinger (2003) and Knoppik and Beissinger (2009)
for microevidence on substantial DNWR in Germany and, more generally, within the European Union,
respectively.
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Figure 1.1: Government spending and real exchange rates: horizontal axis measures change
of government consumption, vertical axis measures change of real effective exchange rate
(positive change corresponds to depreciation); observations are for individual euro area
countries, see Section 1.5 for details. Left panel shows changes for 2001Q1–2007Q4, right
panel shows change for 2010Q1–2015Q4. Note that the correlation coefficient is significant
only for the left panel at the 5% significance level.
private demand for nontraded goods. A cut to government spending, instead, lowers the
relative price of nontraded goods, which stimulates private spending up to the point where
economic activity is completely stabilized. The exchange rate depreciates. Under a peg,
the adjustment is asymmetric. The response to a spending increase is the same as under a
float. Yet, in response to a cut the real exchange rate does not adjust because of downward
nominal wage rigidity. Output of nontraded goods as well as employment fall. We stress
an important qualification of this result: it obtains only if the economy operates near full
capacity to begin with. If, instead, there is slack, the effects of government spending shocks
are symmetric under a peg, but still distinct from the float because the adjustment operates
via output and not through the prices, irrespective of whether government spending is cut
or raised.
We establish these results in closed form for a simplified version of our model. In this
case, we restrict wages to be completely downwardly rigid and show that the effective
supply curve of nontraded goods is kinked: it turns vertical at the point where the economy
operates at full employment, but is horizontal if production falls short of that level. As
5
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a result, the adjustment to government spending shocks is asymmetric if the economy
operates near full employment. In conceptually closely related work, Benigno and Ricci
(2011) show that the Phillips curve is nonlinear in the presence of DNWR, while Dupraz
et al. (2019) account for asymmetric labor market dynamics over the business cycle in a
search model of the labor market which also features DNWR.
We then show the quantitative importance of the asymmetry characterizing the adjust-
ment process in a fully stochastic model of the Greek economy. An increase of government
spending appreciates the real exchange rate by six percent on impact. A cut of government
spending of the same size, instead, induces a depreciation of less than one percent. The
impact multiplier on nontraded output is about one after a spending cut and zero after a
spending increase. It takes about 1.5 years for the adjustment dynamics to become roughly
symmetric.
In the empirical part of the paper, we provide evidence for asymmetric effects of
government spending shocks. For this purpose, we extend and update a fairly rich data
set, originally assembled by Born et al. (2019). It contains quarterly time series data for
government spending shocks for a panel of 38 countries, including both advanced and
emerging market economies. The data runs from the early 1990s to the end of 2018.
Importantly, the database includes two distinct measures of fiscal shocks. First, as in
Ramey (2011b), we identify government spending shocks as the difference between actual
government spending and the forecast of professional forecasters. Second, as in Blanchard
and Perotti (2002), government spending shocks are obtained as forecast errors within a
vector autoregression (VAR) model.
We estimate the response of government spending, the real exchange rate, and output
to both shock series in isolation. For this purpose, we rely on local projections a` la Jorda`
(2005). This approach is particularly suitable for the purpose at hand, since it allows us to
estimate responses for positive and negative shocks separately. Once we estimate the model
on the full sample and do not distinguish between fixed and floating exchange rates, we
find that the responses to spending shocks are fairly symmetric. Importantly, we find very
similar results for both shock measures even though samples do not fully overlap for reasons
of data availability. Specifically, negative spending shocks reduce output and depreciate
the real exchange rate moderately. Positive spending shocks, instead, raise output and
appreciate the exchange rate.
Our model predicts that the adjustment to spending shocks is asymmetric under an
exchange-rate peg. To confront this prediction with the data, we estimate our empirical
6
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model on observations for the individual countries of the euro area because—from the
perspective of the model—membership in the euro area boils down to an exchange-rate
peg as far as the adjustment to government spending shocks is concerned. In our sample,
approximately one third of our observations of the VAR-based shock measure (some 900 of
a total of 2800 observations) pertain to countries in the euro area. For the shock measure
based on professional forecasters, the euro sample is considerably smaller and the shocks
turn out to be a poor predictor for actual government spending. Hence, as we zoom in on
the euro sample we exclusively rely on the VAR-based shock measure.
For this sample, we establish evidence that is fully in line with the predictions of the
model. A government spending cut reduces output but does not alter the real exchange rate.
A spending increase appreciates the real exchange rate but does not alter output. Because
DNWR should be less of a constraint in times of high inflation2, we further condition our
estimates on periods of high inflation. Indeed, we find that the economy responds much
more symmetrically to government spending shocks if inflation is high. What changes is
the adjustment to spending cuts: if inflation is high, the exchange rate depreciates and the
output response is muted—the mirror image of what happens after a positive spending
shock. Lastly, we condition on periods of economic slack and find that the adjustment to
positive spending shocks changes in this case: the response of output becomes stronger and
the response of the exchange rate weaker—just like the model predicts.
During the last decade, countless studies have investigated the effect of government
spending on output, as a recent survey by Ramey (2019) illustrates. In a recent contribution,
Barnichon et al. (2019) find that the contractionary multiplier is above 1 and even larger
in times of economic slack, whereas the expansionary multiplier is substantially below 1
regardless of the state of the cycle. But there are also numerous studies of how government
spending impacts the real exchange rate, with partly conflicting results (among others,
Enders et al., 2011; Kim and Roubini, 2008; Monacelli and Perotti, 2010; Be´ne´trix and Lane,
2013; Ilzetzki et al., 2013; Miyamoto et al., 2019).3 However, these studies do not allow for
an asymmetric response of the exchange rate to government spending shocks. At the same
2The argument that positive inflation greases the wheels of the labor market by facilitating real wage cuts
when nominal wages are sticky downward dates back to Tobin (1972). For more recent contributions, see
for instance Addison et al. (2017) presenting evidence from Portugal that DNWR matters less in periods of
high inflation.
3Standard models predict that positive (negative) government spending shocks appreciate (depreciate)
the real exchange rate. A number of mechanisms have been put forward to rationalize exchange rate
depreciation in response to (positive) shocks (Betts and Devereux, 2000; Corsetti et al., 2012a; Kollmann,
2010; Monacelli and Perotti, 2010; Ravn et al., 2012).
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time, several authors have explored nonlinearities in the fiscal transmission mechanism. This
includes the role of the business cycle and the zero lower bound on interest rates (Christiano
et al., 2011; Ramey and Zubairy, 2018; Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012), sovereign
risk (Corsetti et al., 2013b; Born et al., 2019), and the sign and size of fiscal adjustments
(Giavazzi et al., 2000). Shen and Yang (2018) analyze the role of DNWR in the transmission
of fiscal shocks, just like we do. However, they perform a purely model-based analysis and,
unlike us, do not consider the open economy dimension. Burgert et al. (2019) study the
implications of DNWR for the effects of various fiscal instruments in a medium-scale DSGE
model. Lastly, we refer to work which has highlighted features of particular relevance for
the fiscal transmission mechanism in open economies, such as the role of the exchange rate
regime (Erceg and Linde´, 2012; Corsetti et al., 2013a, 2012b; Born et al., 2013; Ilzetzki et
al., 2013) or sudden stops (Liu, 2018). Bianchi et al. (2019), in turn, study optimal fiscal
policy under a currency peg in the presence of sovereign risk and DNWR.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the baseline
model. In Section 1.3, we make a number of simplifying assumptions and derive closed-form
results. Next, we solve the full model numerically and present quantitative results in Section
1.4. Section 1.5 introduces both our empirical strategy and our data set and establishes the
empirical results in support of the theory. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Model
Our model is an extension of Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2016). It features a small open
economy with two types of goods. One good is not traded internationally, but produced
by a representative firm with labor as the only production factor. Nominal wages are
downwardly rigid. The other good is traded internationally by a representative household.
In each period the household receives an endowment of traded goods and may borrow or
lend internationally via non-contingent debt.
Our innovation relative to the original model by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2016) is that
we allow for government consumption. We assume that it fluctuates exogenously, is financed
through lump-sum taxes, and falls exclusively on nontraded goods. We maintain the last
assumption to enhance the tractability of the model and note that in practice governments
tend to consume some imports. Yet, their weight in overall government spending is much
smaller than for private spending (see e.g. Corsetti and Mu¨ller, 2006).
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1.2.1 Household
There is a representative household endowed with h¯ hours of time, which are inelastically
supplied to the market. The household’s preferences over private and public consumption
are given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
c1−σt − 1
1− σ + ψg
(gNt )
1−ς − 1
1− ς
]
, (1.1)
where Et is the mathematical expectations operator conditional on information available at
time t, ct denotes private consumption in period t, g
N
t denotes government consumption of
nontraded goods, β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, and σ, ς, and ψg are positive constants
with 1/σ being the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Consumption, in turn, is an aggregate of traded goods, cT , and nontraded goods, cN :
ct =
[
ω
(
cTt
) ξ−1
ξ + (1− ω) (cNt ) ξ−1ξ ] ξξ−1 , (1.2)
where ξ is the (intratemporal) elasticity of substitution and ω ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter
governing the weight of traded goods in aggregate consumption. The corresponding
consumer price index (CPI) is given by:
Pt =
[
ωξ
(
P Tt
)1−ξ
+ (1− ω)ξ(PNt )1−ξ] 11−ξ , (1.3)
where P Tt and P
N
t denote the domestic-currency price of traded and nontraded goods,
respectively.
The household receives labor income and firm profits as well as an endowment of traded
goods. In addition, the household may borrow (or save) via a discount bond that pays one
unit of the traded goods with a foreign-currency price P T∗t . The household pays taxes and
spends its income on traded and nontraded goods. Formally, the period budget constraint
in domestic currency reads as follows:
EtP T∗t dt + P Tt cTt + PNt cNt = EtP T∗t
dt+1
1 + rt
+ P Tt y
T
t +Wtht + φt − τt , (1.4)
where Et is the nominal exchange rate defined as the domestic currency price of one unit of
foreign currency. dt denotes the level of foreign debt assumed in period t−1, which is due in
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period t. Wt is the nominal wage, ht denotes hours worked, φt denotes firm profits, defined
below, and τt denotes lump-sum taxes levied by the government. The world interest rate rt
and the endowment of traded output yTt are assumed to be exogenous and stochastic.
We assume that the law of one price holds for traded goods, that is, P Tt = EtP T∗t , and
normalize the foreign-currency price of traded goods to unity: P T∗t = 1. As a result, the
price of traded goods is equal to the exchange rate, P Tt = Et. In addition, we assume
P ∗t /P T∗t = 1, that is, we normalize the foreign relative price of consumption to unity. This
exogeneity assumption is reasonable in the context of our analysis, for we study a small
open economy.
Through its choice of cTt , c
N
t , and dt+1, the representative household maximizes (1.1)
subject to (1.4), and a no-Ponzi scheme constraint:
dt+1 ≤ d¯ , (1.5)
where d¯ is a positive constant. Defining the relative price of nontraded goods, pNt ≡ P
N
t
PTt
,
the optimality conditions of the household are the budget constraint and
cNt : p
N
t =
1− ω
ω
(
cTt
cNt
) 1
ξ
(1.6)
cTt : λt = ω
[
ω
(
cTt
) ξ−1
ξ + (1− ω) (cNt ) ξ−1ξ ] ξξ−1 ( 1ξ−σ) (cTt )− 1ξ (1.7)
dt+1 :
λt
1 + rt
= βEtλt+1 + µt (1.8)
µt ≥ 0 ∧ dt+1 ≤ d¯ with 0 = µt(dt+1 − d¯) (1.9)
as well as a suitable transversality condition for bonds. Here, λt/P
T
t and µt, in turn, are
the Lagrange multipliers associated with (1.4) and (1.5), and (1.9) is the complementary
slackness condition.
1.2.2 Firm
Nontraded output yNt is produced by a representative competitive firm. It operates a
production technology with labor only:
yNt = h
α
t , (1.10)
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where α ∈ (0, 1]. The firm chooses the amount of labor input to maximize profits φt, taking
wages as given:
φt ≡ PNt yNt −Wtht . (1.11)
Optimality requires the following condition to hold:
pNt =
Wt/Et
αyNt /ht
. (1.12)
This condition that price equals marginal costs operates at the heart of the model. To
maintain full employment, a drop in the demand for nontraded goods requires their relative
price to fall. This, in turn, requires a decline in the firm’s marginal costs in order to shift
the supply curve outward and thus to stabilize the demand for labor. Such a decrease in
costs will be passed on into the price of nontraded goods, counteracting the initial drop
in demand. As equation (1.12) shows, an important factor in firm’s real marginal costs
consists of the wage in terms of traded goods. Thus, a decrease in real marginal costs can
be brought about either by a decrease in the nominal wage, Wt, or by an exchange rate
devaluation, that is, an increase in Et.
1.2.3 Labor market
The household faces no disutility from working and will therefore supply labor in order
to meet labor demand to the extent that it does not exceed the total endowment of labor:4
ht ≤ h¯ . (1.13)
Hours worked are determined in equilibrium by the firm’s labor demand. Even though
the labor market is competitive, it will generally not clear because of downward nominal
wage rigidity. Specifically, as in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2016), we assume that in any
given period nominal wages cannot fall to a level smaller than γ > 0 times the wage in the
previous period. Formally, the economy is subject to downward nominal wage rigidity of
the form
Wt ≥ γWt−1 . (1.14)
4We abstract from the non-negativity constraint that wages and hours worked must be weakly positive.
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As a result, there may be involuntary unemployment. This is captured by the following
complementary slackness condition that must hold in equilibrium for all dates and states:
(h¯− ht)(Wt − γWt−1) = 0 . (1.15)
It implies that in periods of unemployment, that is, whenever ht < h¯, the downward
nominal wage rigidity constraint is binding. When the wage constraint is not binding, that
is, whenever Wt > γWt−1, the economy will be at full employment.
In what follows, we use
wt ≡Wt/Et (1.16)
to denote the real wage in terms of traded goods and t ≡ EtEt−1 to denote the gross rate of
devaluation of the domestic currency. Equation (1.14) can then be rewritten as
wt ≥ γwt−1
t
. (1.17)
This expression illustrates that downward nominal wage rigidity operates via effectively
constraining real wages. At the same time, it shows how a currency devaluation, i.e. an
increase in t, may relax the tightness of the constraint.
1.2.4 Real exchange rate
We define the real exchange rate as the price of foreign consumption (expressed in
domestic currency) relative to the price of domestic consumption:
RERt ≡ EtP
∗
t
Pt
, (1.18)
where P ∗t denotes the price of foreign consumption expressed in foreign currency. Note that
under the assumptions made above, we can rewrite the numerator as EtP ∗t = P Tt . Using
the definition of the CPI, given by equation (1.3), we find that the real exchange rate is
inversely related to the relative price of nontraded goods in the following way:
RERt =
[
ωξ + (1− ω)ξ(pNt )1−ξ
]− 1
1−ξ
. (1.19)
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1.2.5 Government spending
The government only consumes nontraded goods gNt and finances its expenditure through
a lump-sum tax:
PNt g
N
t = τt . (1.20)
Government spending gNt is assumed to follow an exogenous process.
1.2.6 Market clearing
Market clearing in the nontraded-goods sector requires
yNt = c
N
t + g
N
t , (1.21)
while the market clearing condition for the traded-goods sector is given by:
cTt = y
T
t − dt +
dt+1
1 + rt
. (1.22)
Labor market equilibrium is characterized by equations (1.13)-(1.15). Appendix 1.A lists
the full set of equilibrium conditions and provides a definition of the equilibrium for a given
exchange rate policy {t}∞t=0, to be specified next.
1.2.7 Exchange rate policy
In order to specify the exchange rate policy, we define the full-employment real wage:
wft ≡
1− ω
ω
(
cTt
h¯α − gNt
) 1
ξ
αh¯α−1 . (1.23)
This expression is obtained by combining the demand and supply schedules of nontraded
goods, (1.6) and (1.12), respectively, the definition of the real wage (1.16), the production
technology (1.10), and the market clearing condition (1.21) when the labor market is
operating at full employment, that is, ht = h¯. This is also the unique real wage associated
with the first-best allocation.
Whether the actual real wage equals its full-employment counterpart depends on the
nominal exchange rate, as expression (1.17) above shows. This gives a role to monetary
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policy, which can stabilize economic activity by setting the nominal exchange rate. But
there are infinitely many combinations of nominal wage and nominal exchange rate which
imply the same real wage—see equation (1.16) above—and therefore the same real exchange
rate. Hence, any exchange rate policy satisfying
t ≥ γwt−1
wft
(1.24)
will make the wage constraint slack and ensure full employment. In what follows, we pick
from this class of full-employment exchange rate policies the one that minimizes movements
in the nominal exchange rate. It is given by
t = max
{
γ
wt−1
wft
, 1
}
. (1.25)
Intuitively, if the full-employment wage is above the lower bound γwt−1, the nominal
exchange rate will not be adjusted at all. Otherwise, it will increase by just enough to
alleviate the constraint.
In our analysis below, we study, in addition to such a scenario of “fully” flexible exchange
rates, the behavior of the economy under fixed exchange rates, as well as intermediate
cases. Formally, we specify the following exchange rate rule (as in Liu (2018)) to capture
alternative exchange rate arrangements:
t = max
{
γ
wt−1
wft
, 1
}φ
, (1.26)
with φ ∈ [0, 1]. The case φ = 0 implements a peg, whereas φ = 1 corresponds to a
full-employment stabilizing float (“float”). In general, the smaller φ, the less flexible the
exchange rate.
1.3 Analytical results
In this section, we establish a number of closed-form results and illustrate the mechanism
that operates at the heart of the model. For this purpose we make a number of simplifying
assumptions and limit our analysis to a perfect foresight scenario. There is a fully unantici-
pated government spending shock in the initial period and everybody understands that no
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further shocks will ever materialize. After describing our simplifying assumptions, we first
show that, starting from a full-employment equilibrium, the real exchange rate and non-
traded output respond asymmetrically to negative and positive government spending shocks
unless the exchange rate is flexible. Next, we show that—under a peg—the adjustment
of the economy to a government spending shock is state-dependent, that is, the response
differs depending on whether the shock happens when the economy is operating at full
capacity or in a state of slack.
1.3.1 Simplifying assumptions
We simplify the model along a number of dimensions. First, following Schmitt-Grohe´ and
Uribe (2016), we assume that U(ct) = ln(ct) and ct = c
T
t c
N
t . In this case the intertemporal
consumption choice is decoupled from the intratemporal choice such that we may solve
for the equilibrium in the market for nontraded goods while taking as given the level of
traded-goods consumption.5 Regarding the production function, we assume that α = 1,
so that the marginal product of labor is constant. We also assume that the endowment of
traded goods, yT , and the world interest rate, r, are constant over time. Without loss of
generality, we set yT = 1. The steady-state level of government consumption is denoted by
g < 1. We also assume that wages are perfectly downwardly rigid, that is, we set γ = 1. In
this case, any contractionary shock is sufficient to induce the wage constraint to become
binding. Furthermore, we set h¯ = 1 and β(1 + r) = 1 and abstract from the borrowing
constraint (1.5), but keep on ruling out Ponzi schemes. Lastly, we assume that initially
there is no outstanding debt, d0 = 0, and that the economy is in steady state.
We list the full set of equilibrium conditions of the simplified model in Appendix 1.B.1.
In what follows, we focus on the optimality conditions that characterize the market for
nontraded goods:
pNt =
cTt
yNt − gNt
(1.27)
pNt = wt . (1.28)
Recall that pNt is the (relative) price of nontraded goods. Given our preference structure, it
5To see this formally, note that λ = 1/cTt replaces condition (1.7): marginal utility of traded consumption
goods does not depend on cNt . Note that this preference structure enhances the tractability of the model,
but is not linear homogenous and therefore not nested by the specification in Section 1.2.
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is inversely linked to the real exchange rate: RERt = 1/p
N
t . Whenever the exchange rate
increases, that is, whenever it depreciates, pNt declines and vice versa.
The first equation, (1.27), represents the demand for nontraded goods. It is “downward
sloping” in nontraded output: yNt = c
N
t + g
N
t . The second equation, (1.28), represents the
supply of nontraded goods. It is “horizontal”, that is, independent of nontraded output,
because in the simplified model marginal costs are constant. Combining both equations
results in the equilibrium condition
wt =
cTt
yNt − gNt
. (1.29)
In the following, we state a number of propositions to present our main results. All
propositions refer to the simplified model. To ease the exposition, we do not provide formal
expressions and relegate the proofs to Appendix 1.B. To make our points as transparent as
possible, we also focus on permanent shocks in this section. Given our assumptions, the
simplified model features degenerate dynamics: in response to the permanent government
spending shock, the economy immediately jumps to the new equilibrium and there are no
further adjustment dynamics. In Section 1.4 below, we solve the full model numerically
and study richer adjustment dynamics in response to non-permanent shocks.
1.3.2 Asymmetric effects of spending shocks
We consider, in turn, the effect of a negative and a positive government spending
shock, both for an exchange-rate peg and for floating exchange rates. Importantly, in this
subsection, we maintain the assumption that, prior to the shock, the economy resides in
the full-employment steady state. We relax this assumption in the next subsection.
Consider first a permanent negative government spending shock taking place at time 0.
Specifically, assume the following process for government spending:
gNt =
g if t < 00 < g < g if t ≥ 0 . (1.30)
For this scenario we obtain our first result.
Proposition 1.1. Under a float, a negative government spending shock brings about
real exchange rate depreciation, the level of nontraded output is fully stabilized, and full
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employment is maintained. In contrast, under a peg, the real exchange rate does not
depreciate, nontraded output declines, and employment falls below its efficient level.
Intuitively, because nominal wages cannot fall to restore full employment, it is the
nominal exchange rate that adjusts under a float and brings about a decline of real wages.
This, in turn, decreases real marginal costs and therefore the relative price of nontraded
goods. As a consequence, the demand for labor and nontraded output are stabilized. In
contrast, under a peg real wages and therefore the relative price of nontraded goods cannot
adjust. Nontraded output falls one-for-one with the decrease of government spending.
We compare this outcome to what happens in response to a positive spending shock.
Specifically, we now assume:
gNt =
g if t < 0g < g¯ < 1 if t ≥ 0. (1.31)
For this scenario, we obtain our second result.
Proposition 1.2. Regardless of the exchange rate regime, a positive government spending
shock does not alter the level of nontraded output and employment. It appreciates the real
exchange rate.
Intuitively, as we assume full employment to begin with, raising government spending
cannot induce a further increase of employment and output of nontraded goods. Instead,
the real exchange adjusts to absorb the shock. Private expenditure is completely crowded
out. The exchange rate regime is irrelevant for this adjustment, because nominal wages are
perfectly flexible to adjust upwards. As they increase, they bring about the same extent of
real appreciation under the peg and the float.
Comparing Proposition 1.1 and Proposition 1.2, we see directly that under a peg the
responses of the real exchange rate and nontraded output to a government spending shock
are asymmetric. The exchange rate appreciates in response to a positive shock, but does not
depreciate in response to a negative shock. Output, instead, does not respond to a positive
shock, but declines in response to a negative shock. For the case of a float, the output
response is zero and therefore symmetric. With respect to the exchange rate response, we
can formally establish an additional result.
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Figure 1.2: The effect of permanent government spending shocks starting from full em-
ployment. The horizontal axis measures the level of production of nontraded output. The
vertical axis measures the price of nontraded goods (the inverse of the real exchange rate).
The downward-sloping curves represent the demand for nontraded goods prior to the shock
(D) and after the shock (D′). The kinked lines represent the effective supply of nontraded
goods prior to the shock (S) and after the shock (S′).
Proposition 1.3. Under a float, the response of the real exchange rate to positive and
negative government spending shocks of the same size is perfectly symmetric.
Figure 1.2 illustrates our results graphically. Both panels focus on the market for
nontraded goods. In the left panel, we show the effect of a negative government spending
shock; in the right panel, the effect of a positive shock. The level of production of nontraded
goods is measured along the horizontal axis. The vertical axis measures the price of
nontraded goods in terms of traded goods. Recall that an increase in the price of nontraded
goods corresponds to an appreciation (a decline) of the real exchange rate. In both panels,
the initial equilibrium is given by point A, the intersection of the supply curve (1.28) and
the downward-sloping demand curve (1.27). Note that the effective supply of nontraded
goods, which takes into account the capacity constraint, is kinked. This feature of the
model drives our results. Once the economy operates at full capacity, output of nontraded
goods cannot be raised any further. It may decline, though, and this, in turn, depends on
how the price of nontraded goods (or, equivalently, the real exchange rate) responds to the
shock.
Consider a negative government spending shock (left panel). For a given price of
18
1.3. Analytical results
nontraded goods, the demand for nontraded goods declines: this is visualized by the shift
from curve D (solid line) to D′ (dashed line). Under a peg with downward nominal wage
rigidity, the real wage cannot fall. As a consequence, the supply curve S stays put and
the relative price cannot fall. The new equilibrium, indicated by “peg”, is characterized
by a lower level of nontraded output and the presence of involuntary unemployment. In
contrast, under a float, the nominal exchange rate depreciates. This reduces the real wage
and shifts the supply curve S (solid) downward to S′ (dashed). The extent of depreciation
is determined by the need to maintain full employment. Hence, the level of output in the
nontraded-goods sector remains unaffected by the shock.
Note that the simplified model features degenerate dynamics: in response to a surprise
permanent change in government spending, the economy immediately jumps to the new
equilibrium and stays there. In case of a peg, the new equilibrium after a negative spending
shock is characterized by permanently lower production and the presence of involuntary
unemployment, with no tendency to return to full employment. The economy never recovers
in this version of the model, because wages are downwardly perfectly rigid (γ = 1). Under a
peg, this implies that the price of nontraded goods (or, equivalently, the real exchange rate)
cannot adjust over time. In case of a float, the new equilibrium after a permanent negative
shock is characterized by full employment and a permanently depreciated real exchange
rate, driven by the depreciated nominal exchange rate.
Consider now the positive government spending shock, displayed in the right panel
of Figure 1.2. It shifts the demand schedule to the right, starting again from the full-
employment equilibrium A. Since the economy already operates at full capacity, the
additional demand is fully absorbed by an increase in the price of nontraded goods. This
happens independently of whether the exchange rate is pegged or floating. In fact, given our
assumptions regarding the exchange rate policy above, the increase in the price of nontraded
goods is purely due to an increase in nominal wages, both under peg and float. For both
exchange rate regimes, private consumption of nontraded goods is completely crowded
out. The new equilibrium features unchanged levels of production of nontraded goods and
employment, while the relative price of nontraded goods is higher (real appreciation). Put
differently, the fiscal multiplier on nontraded output and employment is zero.
Comparing the adjustment across the both panels of Figure 1.2 we stress that adjustment
under the float is symmetric, but asymmetric under the peg. We also compute impulse
response functions for the simple model in order to illustrate the adjustment dynamics.
Figure B.1 in the appendix shows the results.
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Last, we briefly refer to Figure 1.2 in order to highlight a specific feature of the model in
the adjustment to positive government spending shocks that are non-permanent. Consider
once more the right panel of the figure. In response to such a shock the economy first
settles at point “peg”, just like in the case of a permanent shock. Importantly, in this
point nominal wages are higher than in the initial equilibrium A. Now assume that after
a while the demand curve shifts back to S because the level of government spending is
reduced to its initial level. In this case, because nominal wages cannot fall, the supply curve
cannot shift back under the peg and, hence, the economy settles at a new equilibrium with
permanent unemployment. Of course, if wages are permitted to decline over time, that
is, if γ < 1, the economy will gradually converge back to point A. Still, the economy will
undergo a recession once the initial fiscal stimulus is turned off. We discuss the case of
temporary shocks in more detail in Appendix 1.B.7.
1.3.3 Symmetric effects under a peg in times of slack
The previous results on the asymmetric effects of government spending shocks under a
peg hinge on an important assumption: that the economy is at full employment when the
shock takes place. In what follows, we relax this assumption and obtain a new result for
the case of an exchange rate peg, namely that the effects of spending shocks are symmetric,
provided there is sufficient slack in the economy. For this purpose, in order to induce some
slack, we first introduce an additional surprise contractionary shock. Specifically, we assume
that there is now a permanent drop in the endowment of traded goods, yTt , in period 0.
The path of yTt is perfectly known at time 0 and assumed to follow the process
yTt =
1 if t < 0yT0 < 1 if t ≥ 0 . (1.32)
This allows us to establish the following intermediate result.
Lemma. A drop in the endowment reduces consumption demand for traded and nontraded
goods. If the exchange rate is pegged, the downward nominal wage constraint binds and
both the production of nontraded goods and employment decline. The economy operates
below potential.
Intuitively, in response to the negative income shock the household lowers demand for
traded and nontraded consumption. The drop in the traded goods endowment therefore
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spills over into the market for nontraded goods. To maintain full employment, the reduced
demand for nontraded goods would require the relative price of nontraded goods to fall.
As this is not possible under the peg if γ = 1, the endowment shock induces a drop in
nontraded output and employment. Eventually, we are interested in how a government
spending shock plays out in such situation (as opposed to full employment). The next
proposition establishes our result formally.
Proposition 1.4. Consider an exchange-rate peg. The response of the real exchange rate
to positive and negative government spending shocks of the same size is zero and therefore
symmetric, provided
1. there is slack in the economy to begin with
2. and the increase in government consumption is insufficient to restore full employment.
Under these conditions, the output multiplier of government spending is also fully symmetric
and equal to 1.
Figure 1.3 illustrates this result graphically. As before, the left panel shows the case of
a government spending cut, while the right panel shows a spending increase. In contrast
to Figure 1.2, there is now unemployment in the initial equilibrium represented by point
A. As before, a reduction of government spending that shifts the demand curve from D
to D′ does not alter the relative price of nontraded goods under a peg. However, since
the economy is operating below potential, an increase of government spending now raises
employment instead of pushing up nominal and real wages (right panel). Either way, the
economy moves horizontally along the supply curve in response to changes in government
spending, provided they are moderate in the sense of not causing the capacity constraint to
bind. Put differently, the effects of government spending shocks are symmetric in times of
slack.6 Since the price of nontraded goods remains unchanged, private consumption does
not change in response to the fiscal shock. The output multiplier is unity in times of slack.
A corollary of proposition 1.4 is that, while the effects of government spending may
be symmetric for small shocks in times of slack, the response will still be asymmetric for
large enough shocks. If government spending increases shift demand beyond the point
where full employment is restored, the additional adjustment will work via prices rather
6In the full model, the response to government spending shocks is not exactly symmetric under a peg even if
there is slack because the supply curve is nonlinear for α < 1.
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Figure 1.3: The effect of government spending shocks under a peg starting from slack.
The horizontal axis measures the level of production of nontraded output. The vertical
axis measures the price of nontraded goods (the inverse of the real exchange rate). The
downward-sloping curves represent the demand for nontraded goods prior to the shock
(D) and after the shock (D′). The kinked line represents the effective supply of nontraded
goods.
than quantities, that is, the exchange rate will appreciate. In contrast, the adjustment to
spending cuts will always be through output and employment and not via prices. We also
compute the impulse responses to government spending shocks in times of slack and show
the results in Figure B.2 in the appendix.
1.4 Quantitative analysis
We now solve the full model, as outlined in Section 1.2 above. Once we relax the
simplifying assumptions made in Section 1.3, the model features richer adjustment dynamics.
The downside is that we are no longer able to solve the model in closed form. Instead, we
resort to numerical simulations which allow us to assess to what extent the asymmetry
established in the previous section is quantitatively relevant.
We calibrate the model to capture key features of the Greek economy. This is for two
reasons. First, Greece is a small open economy that operates within the euro area. From the
perspective of the model this corresponds to an exchange-rate peg as far as the transmission
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of government spending shocks is concerned. Second, while Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2016)
calibrate their model to Argentina, they also consider an alternative calibration to Greece.
We largely follow their calibration—except in those instances where we explicitly account
for government spending (since they do not).
1.4.1 Model calibration and solution
Table 1.1 summarizes the parameters of the model together with the values that we
assign to them in our numerical analysis. A period in the model corresponds to one quarter.
In the model, we abstract from both foreign inflation and long-run technology growth. Both
factors mitigate the effect of downward nominal wage rigidity. Following Schmitt-Grohe´ and
Uribe (2016), we adjust the value of γ for Greece provided in their paper by the average
quarterly inflation rate in Germany (0.3% per quarter) and the average growth rate of per
capita GDP in the euro periphery (0.3%). We set γ to 0.9982/(1.003 × 1.003) = 0.9922.
This implies that nominal wages can fall at most by 3.1 percent per year. We set the intra-
and intertemporal elasticities of substitution between traded and nontraded goods, ξ and σ,
to 0.44 and 5, respectively, following again Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2016) and Reinhart
and Ve´gh (1995). In line with the estimate of Uribe (1997), we fix the labor share in the
traded goods sector at α = 0.75. We set d¯ = 16.5418, i.e. for numerical reasons we set the
upper limit 1% below the natural debt limit. We normalize the endowment of hours h¯ to
unity. The subjective discount factor β is set to 0.9375, in line with Schmitt-Grohe´ and
Uribe (2016), to obtain a plausible foreign debt-to-GDP ratio.
We specify a VAR(1) process for the exogenous states [yTt , rt]
′ on the basis of the
estimates by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2016) for Greece. The steady-state endowment of
traded goods is normalized to 1, while the mean quarterly interest rate is r = 0.011. We
estimate a separate AR(1) process for the exogenous state gNt , using Greek time-series data
for the period 1995:Q1-2018:Q4. To remove the growth trend, we regress the logged value
on a quadratic trend. The driving process is assumed to be orthogonal to that governing
[yTt , rt]
′. Our empirical measure of government spending gNt is real public consumption
provided by Eurostat (“Final consumption expenditure of general government”, P3 S13).
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Table 1.1: Parameter values used in model simulation
Parameter Value Source/Target
Wage rigidity γ = 0.9922 SGU (2016)
Elasticity of substitution ξ = 0.44 SGU (2016)
Risk aversion, private consumption σ=5 Standard value
Labor exponent production function α = 0.75 Uribe (1997)
Debt limit d¯ = 16.5418 99 % of natural debt limit
Endowment of hours worked h¯ = 1 Normalization
Steady state interest rate r = 0.011 Average interest rate
Steady state traded goods endowment yT = 1 Normalization
Steady state government consumption gN = 0.2548 Greek government spending share
Discount factor β = 0.9375 SGU (2016)
Weight on traded goods in CES ω = 0.37 traded goods share of 0.26
The resulting VAR process is given by
ln yTt
ln 1+rt1+r
ln
gNt
gN
 =
 0.88 −0.42 0−0.05 0.59 0
0 0 0.924


ln yTt−1
ln 1+rt−11+r
ln
gNt−1
gN
+ εt,
εt
iid∼ N
0,
 5.36e− 4 −1.0e− 5 0−1.0e− 5 6.0e− 5 0
0 0 0.02282


.
Finally, we pin down two further parameters as we match two key moments of the data.
The average value of government spending, gN = 0.2548, is set to match the empirical share
of government consumption in GDP, pNgN/(yT + pNyN ) = 0.2123. The weight of traded
goods in aggregate consumption is determined by ω. We set it to 0.37. This implies an
average share of traded goods in total output of 26 percent, in line with the calibration
target by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2016).
In order to solve the model, we largely follow Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2016). In case
of a float, φ = 1, the lagged real wage is not a state variable and the resulting program
coincides with the central planner’s solution. This simplifies the analysis considerably and
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we solve the model numerically by value function iteration over a discretized state space.
In case of a less than fully flexible exchange rate regime, that is, if φ < 1, the lagged real
wage is a state variable, as is the external debt position. To solve the model in this case,
we resort to Euler equation iteration. Appendix 1.C.1 provides details on the discretization
of the state space while Appendix 1.C.2 reports the unconditional moments of the model.
1.4.2 Model impulse responses
Figure 1.4 displays the model impulse responses to a government spending shock. Here
we show generalized impulse response functions (GIRFs) in order to account for nonlinear
adjustment dynamics in the model: for a given initial point in the state space, we compare
how variables evolve over time in response to a shock relative to what happens in a baseline
scenario where the shock does not occur. We then average over one million replications to
integrate out the effect of future shocks. We consider both positive and negative shocks
equal to ±2.2 percentage points of steady state nontraded output. This corresponds to a
one-standard-deviation shock. In the figure, the solid lines represent the dynamics due to
a spending increase, while the dashed lines correspond to a spending cut. We report the
responses for the first 8 quarters after a shock.
In the left column, we show results assuming flexible exchange rates. Recall that in this
case the exchange rate is used to stabilize output at the full-employment level. In the middle
column, we show results for an economy that features an exchange-rate peg and initially
operates at full capacity. In the right-most column, instead, we consider an exchange rate
peg with economic slack, captured by simulations with an average unemployment rate of
14%.7 We also compute impulse responses for an intermediate exchange rate regime and
find, perhaps unsurprisingly, that they are in between those obtained for the peg and the
pure float (see Figure C.5 in the appendix).
The panels in the top row of Figure 1.4 show the dynamics of government spending.
Since government spending is determined exogenously, the dynamics are the same across all
columns. The second and third row show the adjustment of nontraded output, yN , and the
7Using different initial conditions for the scenarios allows us to capture the role of economic slack. In
addition, we also allow for small variations in the initial debt level in order to minimize nonlinear interaction
effects of the initial debt level and the government spending shock. We assume values in the range of
98-99% of the ergodic mean. Under the peg with full employment we set d0 = 13.2276 and w−1 = 1.7637,
for the float we set d0 = 14.1672. The exogenous states are set to their steady-state values. For the peg
with slack we draw from the ergodic distribution by first simulating the model for a burn-in period of 300
quarters.
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Figure 1.4: Generalized impulse responses to one-standard-deviation government spending
shocks. Solid line: spending increase, dashed line: spending cut. Left column: flexible
exchange rate. Middle: exchange rate peg and full employment, right: peg and economic
slack. Top panels: government spending, middle: nontraded output, bottom: real exchange
rate. Horizontal axis measures time in quarters, vertical axis measures effect of shock in
percent of full employment nontraded output y˜N and of the ergodic mean of the RER,
respectively.
real exchange rate, RER, respectively.8 Notice that, as before, a decline of RER represents
8The exchange rate is measured in percent of the ergodic mean. Government spending and nontraded output
are measured in percent of nontraded output under full employment. The latter normalization is used for
better comparability. If we were to use the ergodic mean for nontraded output, the scaling of the IRFs
would be affected by the different unemployment rates in the ergodic distribution across exchange rate
regimes.
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a real appreciation.
Overall, we find that the qualitative results established in Section 1.3 above turn out
to be quantitatively important. A number of points are particularly noteworthy. First, as
established in Proposition 1.1, a cut of government spending (dashed lines) depreciates the
real exchange rate under a float (left column), and nontraded output is fully stabilized.
In contrast, under a peg (middle and right column), the real exchange rate response is
much weaker. Now, and in contrast to Section 1.3, because we no longer restrict wages to
be completely downwardly rigid, the exchange rate does adjust over time. However, its
response is still very much muted compared to the float. As a consequence, nontraded
output declines strongly and persistently in response to the spending cut.
Second, turning to positive spending shocks (solid lines), we obtain dynamics in line
with Proposition 1.2. On impact, the adjustment is independent of the exchange rate regime
provided there is full employment. Output does not fall, and the exchange rate depreciates
for reasons discussed in Section 1.3 above. However, as we simulate the full model, we now
observe richer adjustment dynamics. While initially unaffected, output declines somewhat
over time under the peg because the shock process is mean-reverting rather than permanent.
As government spending gradually returns to its pre-shock level, real wages and the real
exchange rate are required to decline in order to maintain full employment. This is what
happens under the float (left column). Yet it happens more slowly under the peg (middle
panel) because of the downward nominal wage rigidity.9 Hence, we find that under a peg
(with full employment) the impact multiplier of positive government spending shocks on
output is zero. It is negative in the short run.
Third, we find that the real exchange rate response is symmetric under a float, as
established in Proposition 1.3. It is asymmetric under a peg with full employment. Positive
shocks appreciate the real exchange rate, whereas negative spending shocks do induce some
depreciation in the full model, because wages are not fully downwardly rigid and the supply
curve is upward sloping. Yet, the exchange rate response to spending cuts is one order of
magnitude weaker than that to spending increases. Just like for the response of the real
exchange rate, the asymmetry is quite strong for nontraded output, too.
Fourth, we find that the adjustment under a peg is symmetric if there is slack, consistent
with Proposition 1.4 above. This holds both for the exchange rate and for output. In
contrast to what we established for the simplified model, we now observe that the real
9See also Figure B.3 in the appendix.
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exchange rate actually moves, because the supply curve is not perfectly horizontal (α < 1)
and nominal wages are allowed to fall somewhat (γ < 1). But the exchange rate response is
considerably weaker compared to the case of full employment.
1.5 Empirical evidence
In this section, we provide new evidence on how government spending impacts the real
exchange rate. A number of earlier studies have explored the issue and reported different,
partly conflicting results regarding the sign of the response (e.g. Kim and Roubini, 2008;
Monacelli and Perotti, 2010; Corsetti et al., 2012a; Ravn et al., 2012; Ilzetzki et al., 2013).
In what follows we take a fresh look: informed by the model-based analysis above, we ask
whether spending increases and cuts impact the real exchange rate symmetrically or not.
Our analysis builds on Born et al. (2019), both in terms of data and in terms of
identification. Our sample covers observations for 38 emerging and advanced economies.
We consider two identification schemes going back to Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and
Ramey (2011b), respectively (see also Ramey and Zubairy (2018) for a recent discussion).
In both instances, the idea is to measure the surprise component of government spending,
in the first case on the basis of an estimated vector autoregressive (VAR) model, in the
second case on the basis of professional forecasts. In terms of identification, we assume that
both fiscal surprise measures do not reflect an endogenous response of fiscal policy to other
innovations in the economy. As a result, we may interpret them as shocks. We establish
their effect on government spending, output, and the real exchange rate by means of local
projections a` la Jorda` (2005).
1.5.1 Empirical specification
We briefly outline our empirical specification. It establishes the effect of government
spending on the exchange rate on the basis of fiscal shocks, εgi,t, computed in a first step.
Here, indices i and t refer to country i and period t, respectively. We provide more details
below.
In a second step, we estimate local projections, which are particularly suited to account
for potentially asymmetric effects of positive and negative shocks. Specifically, we sort
fiscal shocks according to their sign and define εg+i,t = ε
g
i,t if ε
g
i,t ≥ 0 and 0 otherwise, and
analogously for negative shocks, εg−i,t (see Kilian and Vigfusson, 2011, for this approach).
Letting xi,t+h denote the variable of interest in period t+ h, we estimate how it responds
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to fiscal shocks in period t on the basis of the following specification:
xi,t+h = αi,h + ηt,h + ψ
+
h ε
g+
i,t + ψ
−
h ε
g−
i,t + γZi,t + ui,t+h . (1.33)
Here, the coefficients ψ+h and ψ
−
h provide a direct estimate of the impulse response at
horizon h to a positive and negative shock, respectively. Zi,t is a vector of control variables.
The error term ui,t+h is assumed to have zero mean and strictly positive variance. αi,h and
ηt,h denote country and time fixed effects. We compute standard errors that are robust
with respect to heteroskedasticity as well as serial and cross-sectional correlation (Driscoll
and Kraay, 1998).
1.5.2 Identification
Our identification strategy is explained in Born et al. (2019) in some detail. Here
we summarize the essential aspects. Importantly, we pursue two alternative strategies to
construct fiscal innovations. One strategy has been introduced by Ramey (2011b). The
idea is simply to purge actual government spending growth of what professional forecasters
project spending growth to be. Formally, we have
εgi,t = ∆gi,t − Et−1∆gi,t ,
where ∆gi,t is the realization of government consumption growth and Et−1∆gi,t is the
previous period’s forecast.
The second strategy employs a panel VAR model to compute spending surprises. Let
Xi,t denote a vector of endogenous variables, which includes government spending and
output. We estimate the following model:
Xi,t = αi + ηt +A(L)Xi,t−1 + νi,t,
where A(L) is a lag polynomial and νi,t is a vector of reduced-form disturbances with
covariance matrix E(νi,tν
′
i,t) = Ω. In our analysis below we allow for four lags since the
model is estimated on quarterly data. Assuming i) a lower Cholesky factorization L of
Ω, and ii) that government consumption growth is ordered on top in the vector Xi,t, the
structural shock εgi,t equals the (scaled) first element of the reduced-form disturbance vector
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νi,t, i.e. ε
g
i,t = L
−1νi,t.10
Our identifying assumption, dating back to Blanchard and Perotti (2002), is that the
forecast error of government spending growth is not caused by contemporaneous innovations,
so that it represents a genuine fiscal shock. We make the same assumption with regard to
both measures of fiscal surprises, those obtained in the VAR setting and those obtained on
the basis of professional forecasts. It is also implicit in Ramey (2011b), as she considers a
measure of fiscal shocks based on professional forecasts. For identification to go through,
her (implicit) assumption is that surprise innovations do not represent an endogenous
response to other shocks. As discussed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), the rationale
for this assumption is that government spending can be adjusted only subject to decision
lags. Also, there is no automatic response, since government consumption does not include
transfers or other cyclical items.
1.5.3 Data
Our data set covers 38 countries and contains quarterly observations starting in the
early 1990s and ending in 2018. See Table D.2 in the appendix for specific information
on the country coverage and Born et al. (2019) for more details on the data set. Our
measure of the real exchange rate is the broad real effective exchange rate index compiled
by the BIS, complemented by data for Ecuador, El Salvador, and Uruguay based on the
data for 38 trading partners compiled by Darvas (2012). Our quarterly measure is the
logarithm of the average of the monthly index values. An increase in the index indicates
a depreciation of the economy’s currency against a broad basket of currencies. We proxy
nontraded output by real GDP. Our measures of real GDP and government consumption
are based on national accounts data. The vector of controls in the local projection (1.33)
features four lags of log real government consumption, log real output, log real effective
exchange rate, and the sovereign default premium to control for fiscal stress. The sovereign
default premium measures the spread between foreign currency debt and the risk-free rate
and is the end-of-quarter value. We allow for country-specific linear time trends in output
and government spending. When conditioning on inflation and labor market slack, we
use year-on-year GDP deflator inflation and unemployment as a percentage of the active
10The estimated shocks εˆgi,t in this specification are generated regressors in the second stage. However, as
shown in Pagan (1984), the standard errors on the generated regressors are asymptotically valid under the
null hypothesis that the coefficient is zero; see also Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015), footnote 18, on
this point.
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Table 1.2: Forecast errors of government consumption growth: descriptive
statistics
Prof. Forecasts VAR
Countries 23 38
Observations 1696 2944
Mean -0.016 0.000
RMSE 0.616 1.954
Wald F -statistic 4.9 849.2
Notes: Forecast errors measured in percentage points. Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk-
Wald F -statistic computed using Stata’s xtivreg2 in a first-stage regression of government
consumption growth on the respective forecast error. Robust covariance estimator
clustered at country and quarter level. Professional forecasts are based on Oxford
Economics.
population from the EU-LFS main indicators, respectively.
Professional forecasts are due to Oxford Economics and available for a subset of countries
only. Instead, we are able to compute the VAR-based forecast error for all 38 countries.
Table 1.2 provides a number of basic summary statistics regarding the forecast errors. Over
the full sample, the average forecast errors are close to zero, by construction in the case
of the VAR-based measure. On an individual country basis, Oxford Economics produces
forecasts with a relatively low root mean squared error (RMSE). The VAR forecasts exhibit
a somewhat larger RMSE, but note that in this case the sample is more challenging.
In the last row of Table 1.2, we report a measure of the predictive power of the shocks
for actual government spending growth in the form of an F-statistic along the lines of the
tests conducted in Ramey (2011b) and Ramey and Zubairy (2018).11 We find that the
shock measure based on the forecasts of Oxford Economics do not pass the rule-of-thumb
threshold of 10 proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997), while the VAR-based measure does
with flying colors.12
11Technically, given our panel structure with potentially non i.i.d. errors, we follow the suggestion in Baum
et al. (2007) and check the predictive power of our identified shocks using the Kleibergen and Paap (2006)
rk Wald F -statistic. It is computed in a “first-stage” panel fixed effects regression of the government
consumption growth variable on the respective shock measure. Computing “naive” F -statistics in our
pooled sample yields very similar values.
12The Montiel Olea and Pflueger (2013)-threshold for the 5 percent critical value for testing the null
hypothesis that the 2SLS bias exceeds 10 percent of the OLS bias in our context is 23.1. The results for
the measure based on professional forecasts are more favorable once we assess its predictive power for
government spending as reported by Oxford Economics in real time, which is the relevant measure for the
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1.5.4 Results
We now report our results for both shock measures. Consider Figure 1.5 first. It shows
the results based on the VAR forecast error. The left column displays the impulse responses
to a negative government spending shock, the right column displays the responses to a
positive shock. Throughout, solid lines represent the point estimate, while the dark (and
light) shaded areas indicate 68 (and 90) percent confidence intervals. We measure the time
after impact along the horizontal axis in quarters and the effect of the shock along the
vertical axis in percentage deviation from the pre-shock level. The response of government
spending, shown in the top row, is fairly persistent in both cases, albeit more so in case of a
hike (right column). We show the response of output in the middle row and observe that it is
fairly symmetric. Not only is the initial response comparable in absolute value, the ensuing
adjustment pattern is also quite similar. The strongest output effect obtains between 1 and
1.5 years after impact. Afterwards, output starts to converge back to its pre-shock level.
From a quantitative point of view, the output response suggests a multiplier effect which is
in line with earlier studies as surveyed, for instance, by Ramey (2011a). Assuming that
government consumption accounts for about 15 percent of GDP on average, our finding
that a change in government spending by one percent changes output by about 0.1 percent
on impact, and by about 0.2 after approximately 1 to 2 years, implies a multiplier effect of
about 0.67 and 1.33, respectively.13
Last, we turn to the response of the real exchange rate, shown in the bottom row
of Figure 1.5. We find that a cut of government spending depreciates the real exchange
rate—i.e. the price of foreign consumption in terms of domestic consumption goes up. In
contrast, a spending increase appreciates it—i.e. the price of foreign consumption declines.
The adjustment pattern is not fully symmetric. In particular, the exchange rate responds
more strongly in the short run if spending is cut and more strongly in the medium run if
government spending is raised. By and large, however, we fail to detect a strong asymmetry
in the exchange rate response, and even less so for output. This result conforms well with
the predictions of the model to the extent that there are many countries in our sample
operating a flexible exchange rate regime—see Section 1.3 above.
Our result is also robust across shock measures. This becomes clear as we turn to
financial markets’ assessment of current conditions, see Born et al. (2019). In the present paper, we focus
on actual government spending as reported in the NIPA, in line with the model analysis performed above.
13Note that this ex-post conversion is meant as a rule-of-thumb conversion. See Ramey and Zubairy (2018)
on the intricacies of computing output multipliers.
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Figure 1.5: Adjustment to government spending shock. Identification based on VAR forecast
error. Solid lines represent point estimates, light (dark) shaded areas represent 90 (68)
percent confidence intervals. Horizontal axis measures time in quarters. Vertical axis
measures deviation from pre-shock level in percent.
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Figure 1.6: Adjustment to government spending shock. Identification based on forecast
error of professional forecasters. Solid lines represent point estimates, light (dark) shaded
areas represent 90 (68) percent confidence intervals. Horizontal axis measures time in
quarters. Vertical axis measures deviation from pre-shock level in percent.
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Figure 1.6, which shows results for fiscal shocks computed on the basis of forecast errors of
professional (rather than VAR) forecasts. Note that in this case our sample is quite a bit
smaller because we lack professional forecasts for a number of countries—see again Table
D.2. And yet, even though the sample differs considerably, we find that the results shown
in Figure 1.6 are comparable to those shown in Figure 1.5 above.
We again report the response of actual government spending in the top row, both to
negative spending shocks (left column) and to positive spending shocks (right column).
A noteworthy difference vis-a`-vis the results shown in Figure 1.5 is that the response of
government spending is quite a bit weaker—in general and on impact in particular. This
reflects the fact that here we compute forecast errors on the basis of real-time forecasts and
hence their effect on actually realized government spending is limited. This is also reflected
in the F-statistic reported in the last row of Table 1.2 above.
And yet, the responses of output and the real exchange rate shown in Figure 1.6 are
fairly similar to those shown in Figure 1.5 above. In particular, in Figure 1.6 we again
observe a fairly symmetric output response and a pattern of the exchange rate adjustment
that resembles the one shown in Figure 1.5 rather closely. We note, however, that the
depreciation of the exchange rate in response to the spending cut is no longer significant—as
our model-based analysis predicts for countries with a fixed exchange rate regime.
The central prediction of the model put forward in Section 1.3 above is that whether or
not government spending shocks impact the real exchange rate asymmetrically depends
on the exchange rate regime. There should be no asymmetric effects in case the exchange
rate floats freely, but significant asymmetries under an exchange-rate peg. To explore this
aspect further, we focus on the countries in the euro area.14 Here the nominal exchange
rate is permanently fixed and may not bring about the necessary adjustment of the real
exchange rate in response to government spending shocks. Note that we rely only on the
VAR-based forecast errors as we turn to the countries in the euro area because for this
subsample we find that the forecast errors based on professional forecasts hardly impact
actual government spending at all (the Wald F -statistic is 0.528 in this case). As a result,
we are unable to obtain reliable estimates for this subsample once we use the shock measure
computed on the basis of professional forecasts. The VAR-based shocks remain strong
predictors of actual government spending (the Wald F -statistic is 376.14 in this case).
We report the results for the panel composed of the individual countries of the euro
14Here we restrict our sample to observations for euro area countries after their exchange rates vis-a`-vis the
euro have been “irrevocably” fixed—see Table D.2 for the detailed sample coverage.
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Figure 1.7: Adjustment to government spending shock in individual countries of the euro
area. Identification based on VAR forecast error. Solid lines represent point estimates, light
(dark) shaded areas represent 90 (68) percent confidence intervals. Horizontal axis measures
time in quarters. Vertical axis measures deviation from pre-shock level in percent.
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area in Figure 1.7. The figure is organized just like Figures 1.5 and 1.6 above. The fiscal
shocks are computed on the basis of an estimated VAR model, as in Figure 1.5. The only
difference is the underlying sample, since Figure 1.7 shows the results for euro area countries
only. This has a strong bearing on the results.
The response of government spending (shown again in the top row) is fairly symmetric
for spending cuts and spending hikes as before. However, we now find the model predictions
fully borne out by the evidence: output drops in response to a spending cut, but is virtually
unchanged if government spending is raised. Instead, the exchange rate does not respond
to a spending cut, but appreciates in response to a spending increase. We stress once more
that the asymmetry obtains only once we restrict our sample to countries that operate
under fixed exchange rate—just like the model in Section 1.3 above predicts.
In the model, the asymmetric response to government spending shocks under a peg is
caused by downward nominal wage rigidity. It prevents real wages to decline in response to
a spending cut, but does not prevent them from rising in response to a spending increase.
Yet, if inflation is high to begin with, downward nominal wage rigidity should have less of a
bearing on the adjustment because in this case wages are adjusting in real terms, even if
they are nominally rigid. To assess this implication of the model empirically, we estimate
our empirical specification once more on the individual countries of the euro area but focus
on high-inflation periods. Specifically, we specify a threshold for year-on-year inflation of 3
percent. In our sample, 25 percent of the observations qualify as high-inflation episodes on
the basis of this definition.15 We repeat our second-stage estimation on the high-inflation
observations.
Figure 1.8 shows the results. The organization of the figure mimics again those of the
figures above. However, we now show distinct impulse responses for high-inflation episodes
(dashed lines) and contrast them with the baseline case for the euro area (solid lines). Here
shaded areas indicate 90 percent confidence intervals. Overall we find that the adjustment
dynamics are quite similar. However, there are also some differences and they align well
with theory. In particular, we find that, in response to a spending cut, the exchange rate
tends to depreciate when inflation is high. Put differently, the response of the exchange rate
to government spending shocks is again symmetric provided that inflation is high—even
if countries operate under a fixed exchange rate regime. Moreover, as the exchange rate
depreciates in response to a spending cut, output tends to decline less during high-inflation
15This threshold is high enough for Germany to never experience a high-inflation episode.
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Figure 1.8: Adjustment to government spending shock in individual countries of the euro
area when inflation is above 3 percent (dashed lines) and in the baseline euro-area sample
(solid lines). Solid and dashed lines represent point estimates, shaded areas represent 90
percent confidence intervals. Horizontal axis measures time in quarters. Vertical axis
measures deviation from pre-shock level in percent.
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periods compared to the baseline. Whether inflation is high or not, instead, turns out to be
largely inconsequential for the adjustment to spending hikes. Once more, these findings lend
support to the model predictions derived in Section 1.3 above. For the model predicts that,
in response to a positive spending shock, downward nominal wage rigidity is inconsequential.
It is only in response to a spending cut that it matters—provided that inflation is sufficiently
low.
In a last experiment, we condition the effects of government spending shocks on the
extent of economic slack. In earlier empirical work Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012,
2013) find that the effects of fiscal policy are stronger in a recession than they are in a
boom. Ramey and Zubairy (2018) instead find that multipliers generally do not depend
on the extent of slack in the economy. Our model with DNWR provides a refinement for
fixed exchange rate regimes. It predicts that economic slack alters the effects of government
spending shocks, but only those of positive shocks. Raising government spending in times
of slack should impact output rather than the exchange rate, as opposed to when the
economy is operating at full capacity. Put differently, the model predicts that, in times of
slack, government spending shocks impact the economy symmetrically, even if there is an
exchange rate peg.
We now take up this issue empirically and estimate the model for episodes of economic
slack, again only within the euro-area sample. For this purpose we include only observations
in our sample for which unemployment is above a country’s median unemployment value,
as in Barro and Redlick (2011). Figure 1.9 shows the results. Consider first the left column:
as predicted by the model, slack (red line) does not alter the response to a spending cut
relative to the baseline (blue line). Output contracts and the real exchange rate does not
adjust. However, slack does alter the response to a spending hike. Just like the model
predicts, output rises in response to a spending increase in times of slack, while the exchange
rate response is muted and basically insignificant.
In sum, we find that the empirical evidence on the effects of government spending shocks
aligns well with the predictions of the model. This holds for our main result, namely that
economies with fixed exchange rates respond asymmetrically to positive and negative shocks.
But it also holds for the predictions regarding the specific role of DNWR and economic
slack.
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Figure 1.9: Adjustment to government spending shock in individual countries of the euro
area in times of slack (dashed lines) and in the baseline euro-area sample (solid lines). Solid
and dashed lines represent point estimates, shaded areas represent 90 percent confidence
intervals. Horizontal axis measures time in quarters. Vertical axis measures deviation from
pre-shock level in percent.
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1.6 Conclusion
We show that the adjustment to government spending shocks is asymmetric under fixed
exchange rates. Assuming full employment, an increase of government spending appreciates
the real exchange rate and does not impact output and employment. A reduction of
government spending, instead, lowers output and employment and does not impact the
exchange rate very much. We derive these results in a stylized model of a small open
economy which features downwardly rigid nominal wages as in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe
(2016). We establish new evidence based on a large panel data set and show that the
predictions of the model are borne out in the data along several dimensions: the exchange
rate regime, the state of the business cycle, and the level of inflation.
Our result has the potential to reconcile Keynesian and classical views on the role of
fiscal stabilization policy in open economies. The Keynesian view holds that fiscal policy
impacts economic activity strongly if the nominal exchange rate is fixed. According to
the classical view, fiscal policy impacts mostly prices. In light of our analysis, both views
appear to be (somewhat) correct—it is just a matter of the sign of the fiscal impulse. In a
sense, this is bad news because raising government spending is likely to only appreciate the
exchange rate, while austerity is likely to be particularly detrimental to economic activity.
Yet, our analysis also provides a rigorous argument for a strongly countercyclical conduct
of fiscal policy under fixed exchange rates. After all, our results suggest that cutting
government spending during booms is highly effective in reducing inflationary pressures,
while raising spending in deep recessions boosts output and employment considerably.
However, in conclusion, we also note that our analysis is purely positive and any policy
conclusion is therefore tentative. We leave a rigorous analysis of optimal fiscal policy in
this framework for future work.
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Appendix
1.A Full set of equilibrium conditions (baseline model)
Definition 1.5. An equilibrium is defined as a set of stochastic processes {cTt , ht, dt+1, wt, λt, µt, }∞t=0
satisfying
cTt = y
T
t − dt +
dt+1
1 + rt
(1.A.1)
λt = ω
[
ω(cTt )
ξ−1
ξ + (1− ω)(hαt − gNt )
ξ−1
ξ
] ξ
ξ−1 (
1
ξ
−σ)
(cTt )
− 1
ξ (1.A.2)
λt
1 + rt
= βEtλt+1 + µt (1.A.3)
µt ≥ 0 ∧ dt+1 ≤ d¯ with 0 = µt(dt+1 − d¯) (1.A.4)
wt
αhα−1t
=
1− ω
ω
(
cTt
hαt − gNt
) 1
ξ
(1.A.5)
wt ≥ γwt−1
t
(1.A.6)
ht ≤ h¯ (1.A.7)
0 = (h¯− ht)
(
wt − γwt−1
t
)
, (1.A.8)
as well as a suitable transversality condition, given initial conditions {w−1, d0}, exogenous
stochastic processes {yTt , rt, gNt }∞t=0, and an exchange rate policy {t}∞t=0.
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1.B Analytical model
1.B.1 Full set of equilibrium conditions (simplified model)
Given the preferences and the functional forms assumed in Section 1.3, we obtain the
following equilibrium conditions:
cTt = 1− dt +
dt+1
1 + r
(1.B.1)
yNt = ht = c
N
t + g
N
t (1.B.2)
1
cTt
=
1
cTt+1
(1.B.3)
pNt =
cTt
ht − gNt
(1.B.4)
pNt = wt (1.B.5)
RERt =
1
pNt
(1.B.6)
wt ≥ wt−1
t
∧ ht ≤ 1 with 0 = (1− ht)
(
wt − wt−1
t
)
(1.B.7)
wft =
cTt
1− gNt
(1.B.8)
t = max
{
wt−1
wft
, 1
}φ
(1.B.9)
0 = lim
j→∞
(
1
1 + r
)j
dt+j . (1.B.10)
Consequently, the initial steady state is given by d−1 = 0, cT−1 = yT = 1, cN−1 = 1 − g,
where g denotes the steady state value of government consumption, pN−1 = w−1 =
1
1−g , and
RER−1 = 1− g.
1.B.2 Proof Proposition 1.1
The Euler equation (1.B.3) implies that traded consumption is constant at its new
value, i.e., cTt = c
T
t+1 for all t ≥ 0. The resource constraint (1.B.1) then implies dt+11+r − dt =
dt+2
1+r − dt+1 for all t ≥ 0. Thus, if there is any increase in debt in one period, debt will keep
increasing. This is a reflection of the well-known random walk property of consumption in
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this type of setup. Any increase in additional traded consumption financed by debt persists
in future periods and, given a constant endowment yT , needs to be financed by further
additional debt issuance. Because this continuing debt accumulation would violate the
transversality condition (1.B.10), debt needs to be constant at its initial value of 0, i.e.,
dt = 0 and c
T
t = y
T = 1 for all t ≥ 0.16 In period 0, the nontraded goods resource constraint
(1.B.2) implies cN0 = y
N
0 − g, while equations (1.B.4) and (1.B.5) imply that the real wage
is given by w0 =
1
h0−g . Thus, we need to solve for nontraded output y
N
0 and hours worked
h0, which both depend on the exchange rate arrangement.
Peg (φ = 0): Conjecture that the economy is in a situation of unemployment with
h0 < 1. In this case, the wage constraint (1.B.7) must be binding: w0 =
w−1
0
. Under the
peg, the gross nominal exchange rate devaluation is given by 0 = 1. Consequently, the
real wage is given by w0 =
1
h0−g =
1
1−g = w−1, which implies 1 − g = h0 − g < 1 − g.
This, in turn, requires g > g, which is true by assumption (1.30). This proves that h0 < 1
indeed is the equilibrium employment level, which is associated with the output level
yN0 = h0 =
1
w−1 + g = 1− (g − g).
Float (φ = 1): Again conjecture that the economy is in a situation of unemploy-
ment with h0 < 1. The gross nominal exchange rate devaluation follows from (1.B.9) as
0 = max
{
1−g
1−g , 1
}
=
1−g
1−g . This implies h0 − g = 1 − g. The assumption that h0 < 1
therefore leads to a contradiction: 1− g = h0 − g < 1− g. Consequently, it must be that
yN0 = h0 = 1 and the economy is at its full-employment equilibrium.
From (1.B.4) then follows that pN0,peg =
1
h0−g =
1
1−g >
1
1−g = p
N
0,f loat. Hence, a negative
government spending shock causes a fall in pN and a corresponding increase in RER—i.e.,
real exchange rate depreciation— under a float, but not under a peg. 
16A different way to see this is to notice that this equation is a homogenous second-order difference equation
with roots (1 + r) and 1. Given d0 and the transversality condition, the unstable root can be ruled out.
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1.B.3 Proof Proposition 1.2
Conjecture that the shock does not cause unemployment, that is, h0 = 1. Then it must
be that the wage constraint is not binding, so that
w0 =
1
1− g¯ >
1
(1− g)0 =
w−1
0
. (1.B.11)
Peg (φ = 0): With a gross nominal exchange rate devaluation rate equal to 0 = 1,
equation (1.B.11) implies that 1− g > 1− g¯. This is true by assumption (1.31).
Float (φ = 1): Equations (1.B.8) and (1.B.9) imply a gross nominal exchange rate
devaluation rate of 0 = max
{
1−g¯
1−g , 1
}φ
= 1. The same logic as in the peg case then
requires that h0 = 1.
Thus, full employment h0 = 1 is the equilibrium, regardless of the exchange rate regime.
From (1.B.4) then follows that the price of nontraded goods increases and therefore the real
exchange rate appreciates by the same amount: pN0,peg = p
N
0,f loat =
1
1−g¯ >
1
1−g = p
N−1. 
1.B.4 Proof Proposition 1.3
For a negative and a positive shock of the same magnitude, we have g¯− g = g− g. From
equation (1.B.6) and propositions 1.1 and 1.2 then follows that in response to a negative
shock
∆RER− =
1
pN0,f loat
− 1
pN−1
= (1− g)− (1− g) = g − g = (g¯ − g) , (1.B.12)
while for a positive shock
∆RER+ = (1− g¯)− (1− g) = −(g¯ − g). (1.B.13)

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1.B.5 Proof Lemma 1.3.3
The resource constraint in (1.B.1) becomes
cTt = y
T
t − dt +
dt+1
1 + r
. (1.B.14)
We can solve the nontraded goods block by backward induction. The Euler equation (1.B.3)
implies that traded consumption jumps to a new level and stays there, i.e., cTt = c
T
t+1 for
all t ≥ 0. The resource constraint (1.B.1) again implies dt+11+r − dt = dt+21+r − dt+1 for all
t ≥ 1. Thus, if there is any increase in the face value of debt after t = 1, debt will keep
increasing and it will violate the transversality condition (1.B.10). Therefore, debt needs to
be constant at its value at the beginning of period one, d1. The Euler equation and the
resource constraint then imply
cT0 = y
T
0 +
d1
1 + r
= 1− r
1 + r
d1 = c
T
1 . (1.B.15)
From this follows that the debt choice d1 is given by
d1 = 1− yT0 . (1.B.16)
Thus, the household will smooth traded consumption by borrowing the shortfall from abroad
and permanently foregoing the annuity out of this debt in terms of consumption:
cT0 = 1−
r
1 + r
(1− yT0 ). (1.B.17)
Given the drop in traded consumption, equation (1.B.4) shows that hours worked h0
must also fall. The latter follows from the binding wage constraint, which pins down the
relative price via equation (1.B.5) as pN0 = w0 = w−1. As a consequence, the traded goods
endowment shock causes the economy to contract and unemployment to rise. 
1.B.6 Proof Proposition 1.4
First, consider the case of a government spending cut from g to g. Given that the
relative price of nontraded goods cannot fall under a peg with γ = 1, equation (1.B.5)
implies an additional one-to-one fall of hours worked and therefore nontraded output in
order to keep the denominator constant. The real exchange rate then stays constant as
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well. Now consider an increase in government spending from g to g¯. The response of the
real exchange rate depends on the movement in the relative price of nontraded goods,
which is in turn a function of the relative demand. It will increase whenever the increase
in government demand for the nontraded good is sufficient to more than compensate the
reduction in private demand caused by the traded goods endowment shock. As long as this
is not the case, the economy remains in a situation of unemployment, the wage constraint
keeps binding, and the relative price is pinned down by pN0 = w0 = w−1. In this case,
the real exchange rate response is symmetric to the one observed under a negative shock,
namely nil. Any increase in government spending will increase hours worked and hence
output one-for-one.
Equation (1.B.5) allows us to compute the minimum size of g¯ after the endowment
shock that restores full employment, which is equivalent to the maximum allowable level of
g¯ for which the exchange rate response is zero. Given
pN0 =
cT0
1− g¯ =
1− r1+r
(
1− yT0
)
1− g¯ =
1
1− g = p
N
−1, (1.B.18)
it follows that 1− r1+r
(
1− yT0
)
= 1−g¯1−g . The left-hand side here represents the gross rate
of change in traded consumption relative to the baseline level of 1. The right-hand side
represents the gross rate of change in the private consumption of nontraded goods. Whenever
these rates are equal, government consumption of nontraded goods exactly compensates the
private demand shortfall caused by the endowment shock. In this case, the relative price
and therefore the real exchange rate do not change. The above equation also makes clear
that any increase of government spending above g¯ will cause the relative price to increase
above its initial level and the real exchange rate to appreciate. 
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1.B.7 IRFs to permanent shocks
Spending Cut
peg
float
Spending Increase
Figure B.1: Impulse responses in the analytical model to a permanent surprise government
spending cut (left column) and permanent government spending hike (right column), starting
from a full-employment steady state.
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cut
increase
(a) Small spending shock
(b) Large spending shock
Figure B.2: Impulse responses in the analytical model to a permanent surprise government
spending cut (solid line) and permanent government spending hike (dashed line) of the
same size, starting from a situation of economic slack. The top panel depicts a small change
in government spending insufficient to restore full employment, resulting in a perfectly
symmetric response of traded output and no change of the real exchange rate. The bottom
panel depicts a large change in spending that is sufficient to restore full employment,
resulting in an asymmetric response of both output and the real exchange rate.
49
1.B. Analytical model
1.B.8 IRFs to temporary shocks
A temporary surprise change in government spending can be conceptualized as a surprise
permanent shock, followed by an anticipated offsetting permanent shock one period later.
Because the intertemporal problem is decoupled from the intratemporal one, anticipation of
a future decrease of government spending has no immediate effect per se. Figure B.3 shows
the results. A temporary cut in government spending causes a drop in output, followed by
a return to full employment when government spending recovers. In contrast, a temporary
increase in government spending initially has no effect on output as the real exchange rate
appreciates and private activity is crowded out. But once government spending returns to
its old, lower level, the real exchange rate cannot adjust and there is no crowding in. As a
consequence, the economy enters a permanent state of depression. This is a consequence
of our assumption that wages can never fall. It also shows that increases in government
spending can be harmful, even if they do not immediately affect output. By increasing the
wage, they increase the likelihood that the wage constraint becomes binding in the future,
making the economy more prone to recessions when negative shocks hit.
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Spending Cut
peg
float
Spending Increase
Figure B.3: Impulse responses in the analytical model to a one-period surprise government
spending cut (left column) and one-period government spending hike (right column), starting
from a full-employment steady state.
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1.C Quantitative model
1.C.1 State space discretization
We discretize the state space for the past real wage, w−1 using 800 equally-spaced points
on a log grid range [w− , w¯]. We set w− = 1 for the peg and w− = 0.05 for the intermediate
regime. The former choice reflects the compression of real wage outcomes in simulations
under the float. We set w¯ = 7.5 for both policy arrangements. To discretize the current debt
state, dt, we use 501 equally spaced points on the range [8, 16.5418]. To model the exogenous
driving forces, we discretize the state space using 7 equally spaced points for ln yTt and 5
equally spaced points for ln 1+rt1+r over the range ±
√
10σ. We obtain transition matrices on
the basis of the simulation approach of Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2014) with T = 5,000,000
and a burn-in of 10,000 periods. We trim state pairs yTt (i), rt(i) that occur with probability
zero during our simulations. This reduces the transition probability matrix from size 35×35
to 33×33. For the gNt -process, we use the Tauchen and Hussey (1991) approach to discretize
it to 9 realizations. The full transition probability matrix of the exogenous state vector
[yTt , rt, g
N
t ]
′ is finally obtained as the Kronecker product of the two transition matrices. We
opt for this two-stage approach for the following reason. While the simulation approach
allows us to handle correlated states easily, convergence of the transition probabilities is
relatively slow. As a result, transition matrices for symmetric and partially uncorrelated
processes like ours tend to show slight asymmetries and correlations. As we are interested
in asymmetries introduced by the model’s transmission process, such spurious asymmetries
in the exogenous process would be problematic when computing generalized IRFs. We
circumvent this issue by relying on an analytical approach for government spending.
1.C.2 Unconditional moments and debt distribution
Table C.1 displays unconditional first and second moments of some macro indicators
of interest obtained from a simulation of 1 million quarters. These statistics are in line
with the predictions of the model. In particular, mean unemployment is shown to decrease
from 14% to nil when moving from a peg to a fully stabilizing float. Analogously, mean
(nontraded) consumption and nontraded output increase with the degree of exchange rate
flexibility, whereas their respective volatilities are lower. Moreover, the real wage under a
peg displays a higher mean but lower standard deviation when compared to the other two
regimes, a reflection of the fact that the wage constraint tends to be binding more often.
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The average external debt-to-GDP ratio increases from 90% per year in the peg economy
to 116% and 122% per year under the intermediate regime and the float, respectively. As
shown in figure C.4, this is due to the distribution of external debt being more dispersed
under the peg, which requires a higher level of precautionary savings.
Table C.1: First and second moments of indicators of interest in the three policy arrange-
ments
Mean(peg) Std(peg) Mean(int) Std(int) Mean(float) Std(float)
h¯− ht 0.141 0.115 0.032 0.040 0.000 0.000
ct 0.697 0.142 0.753 0.100 0.767 0.092
cNt 0.635 0.139 0.721 0.079 0.745 0.070
yNt 0.890 0.103 0.976 0.031 1.000 0.000
yTt − cTt 0.153 0.099 0.161 0.117 0.162 0.119
wt 2.606 0.249 1.946 0.448 1.822 0.486
yTt 1.002 0.067 1.002 0.067 1.002 0.067
rannt 0.045 0.055 0.044 0.055 0.045 0.055
dt 13.509 0.076 14.386 0.050 14.463 0.046
dt/4(y
T
t + p
N
t c
N
t ) 0.902 0.263 1.165 0.485 1.217 0.524
G/Y 0.213 0.047 0.180 0.051 0.174 0.052
Notes: Statistics are based on a simulation length of 1 million periods and a burn-in of
1000 periods.
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Figure C.4: Distribution of external debt in the three policy arrangements. Statistics are
based on a simulation length of 1 million periods and a burn-in of 1000 periods.
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1.C.3 GIRFs: Intermediate case
Float (φ = 1) Intermediate (φ = 0.33) Peg (φ = 0)
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Figure C.5: Generalized impulse responses to positive and negative government spending
shocks of 2.2 percentage points of nontraded output. GIRFs start from a situation of
moderate debt and full employment at the boundary to the unemployment region (see
main text for details). Solid blue line: positive shock; dashed red line: negative shock.
Top panels: government spending, middle: nontraded output, bottom: real exchange rate.
Horizontal axis measures time in quarters, vertical axis measures effect of shock in percent
of full employment nontraded output y˜N and of the ergodic mean of the RER, respectively.
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Table D.2: Sample ranges
VAR Oxford Economics EMU
Country Range T Range T Range T
Argentina 1994Q4-18Q4 66 1999Q3-17Q4 43 - -
Australia 2004Q1-10Q3 16 2004Q1-10Q3 16 - -
Austria 1994Q4-18Q4 97 1997Q1-17Q4 80 1999Q1-18Q4 80
Belgium 1992Q4-18Q4 105 - - 1999Q1-18Q4 80
Brazil 1997Q2-18Q4 87 - - - -
Bulgaria 2008Q2-18Q4 43 - - - -
Chile 2000Q2-18Q4 75 2000Q2-17Q4 69 - -
Colombia 2001Q2-17Q4 67 - - - -
Croatia 2005Q1-18Q4 56 - - - -
Czech Republic 2005Q1-18Q4 56 2005Q1-17Q4 52 - -
Denmark 1992Q2-18Q4 94 1997Q1-17Q4 68 - -
Ecuador 1996Q1-18Q4 76 - - - -
El Salvador 2003Q2-17Q3 58 - - - -
Finland 1993Q2-18Q4 103 1999Q2-17Q4 73 1999Q1-18Q4 80
France 2000Q1-18Q4 76 2000Q1-17Q4 70 2000Q1-18Q4 76
Germany 2005Q1-18Q4 56 2005Q1-17Q4 52 2005Q1-18Q4 56
Greece 1996Q2-18Q4 83 2001Q4-17Q4 55 2000Q3-18Q4 66
Hungary 2000Q1-18Q4 76 2000Q1-17Q4 70 - -
Ireland 1996Q2-18Q4 91 2004Q1-17Q4 56 1999Q1-18Q4 80
Italy 1992Q2-18Q4 107 1997Q1-17Q4 80 1999Q1-18Q4 80
Latvia 2007Q1-18Q4 48 - - 2013Q3-18Q4 22
Lithuania 2006Q2-18Q4 51 - - 2014Q3-18Q4 18
Malaysia 2001Q2-17Q4 67 2001Q1-17Q4 66 - -
Mexico 1994Q4-18Q4 97 - - - -
Netherlands 2000Q1-18Q4 76 2000Q1-17Q4 70 2000Q1-18Q4 76
Peru 1998Q1-18Q4 79 - - - -
Poland 1996Q2-18Q4 91 - - - -
Portugal 1996Q2-17Q4 87 1998Q4-17Q4 75 1999Q1-17Q4 76
Slovakia 2005Q1-18Q4 56 2005Q2-17Q4 51 2008Q3-18Q4 42
Slovenia 2004Q1-18Q4 60 - - 2006Q3-18Q4 50
South Africa 1995Q4-17Q4 89 - - - -
Spain 1996Q2-18Q4 91 1997Q1-17Q4 80 1999Q1-18Q4 80
Sweden 1994Q2-18Q4 82 1998Q3-17Q4 60 - -
Thailand 1998Q2-17Q4 79 1999Q3-17Q4 72 - -
Turkey 1999Q2-17Q4 75 2000Q1-17Q4 70 - -
United Kingdom 1996Q2-18Q4 91 1997Q1-17Q4 80 - -
United States 2008Q4-17Q3 36 2008Q4-17Q3 36 - -
Uruguay 2002Q2-17Q4 58 - - - -
Total 2801 1444 962
Notes: Range refers to the first and last observation available. Note that the VAR-approach requires
5 observations to construct 4 lags of growth rates. T refers to the number of observations used for the
particular country after accounting for missing values and lag construction in the unconditional model.
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Chapter 2
Public and private deleveraging in Greece:
2010-2014
2.1 Introduction
How large are the contributions of public-sector deleveraging (or austerity) and private-
sector deleveraging to the output contraction in Greece? This paper assesses the macroeco-
nomic effects of the austerity policies implemented in Greece during the 2010-14 period, a
period characterized by substantial cuts in government spending and exceptionally high
debt, and the additional impact of a deleveraging shock in the private sector. Following
an excessive increase in public sector employment and wages during the early 2000s, all
peripheral countries in the euro area experienced a severe contraction due to a combination
of downward nominal wage rigidity and fixed exchange rates, which made real wages too
high to be compatible with full employment. However, Greece displayed the most dismal
performance. It stands out as having the sharpest decline in GDP and government spending
in the euro area. Per capita income at the end of 2014 was more than 25 per cent below
its 2009 level. Over the same time period, government spending per capita decreased by
almost 22 per cent. In this paper, I consider output in the nontraded sector, as this sector
is relatively more important in Greece, and the foreign debt-to-GDP ratio, which rose by a
staggering amount, as macro indicators of interest, thereby providing a minimal summary
of the country’s economic performance.
A joint analysis of public and private deleveraging is relevant because they are likely to
interact in such a way that adverse dynamics reinforce each other. More precisely, efforts to
reduce the level of borrowing in both sectors may raise the level of debt relative to current
GDP because of their contractionary effect on economic activity. A joint deleveraging
effort is likely to have more adverse effects than just the sum of the effects of each effort in
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isolation. As documented in the next chapter, both public and private deleveraging are
highly correlated with unemployment rates in Europe and may help explain the heterogeneity
in unemployment dynamics between core and peripheral countries. Countries which suffered
from a strong increase in unemployment also implemented large austerity measures, mostly
in the form of spending cuts, and experienced (sizable) private-sector deleveraging in the
period after 2009.
From a methodological point of view, I measure austerity as in House et al. (2019), that
is, as a shortfall in government spending relative to forecast. The drawback of this approach,
which borrows heavily from Blanchard and Leigh (2013), is that in principle austerity may
emerge following a huge expansion of the public sector in the years prior to the crisis just
because government spending is below a steep trend. Figure 2.1 shows actual government
spending and the predicted trend for Greece. The deviation from the forecast after 2010 is
considerable, which suggests substantial austerity. The approach adopted here differs from
Alesina and coauthors’ approach in several dimensions. For instance, Alesina et al. (2015a)
and Alesina et al. (2016) analyze multi-year fiscal plans using data since 1978, whereas this
paper, following House et al. (2019), focuses on the 2010-14 period, that is, the aftermath
of the crisis, and on the actual changes in government spending over the five years. This
allows to capture the full effect of any policy that was actually implemented. Importantly,
the narrative approach adopted by Alesina and coauthors addresses the endogeneity issue
inherent in the identification but it requires judgment in interpreting policy statements.
Moreover, I only consider austerity in the form of cuts in government spending and not
increases in taxes, as House et al. (2019) find that the former is the most significant fiscal
policy for explaining the decline in output in the 2010-14 period. I compare the baseline
scenario with the currency peg and the counterfactual scenario without the euro, that is,
with fully flexible exchange rates. A similar analysis has been conducted in the first chapter
in a stochastic context, with the difference that here I feed actual shocks into the model
and, crucially, study the joint effect of public and private deleveraging.
I develop a two-sector small open economy model featuring downward nominal wage
rigidity a` la Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2016). I assume that the government consumes an
exogenously determined amount of nontraded goods. In order to finance these purchases, it
levies lump-sum taxes so that its budget is balanced at all times. I contrast the case of an
exchange-rate peg and the case of flexible exchange rates. More specifically, I consider a
float where the exchange rate adjusts in such a way as to offset the nominal rigidity. In this
case, output and employment are always stabilized at the efficient level.
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Andre´s et al. (2016), too, study a small open economy which operates in a currency
union and analyze how fiscal consolidation interacts with private-sector deleveraging but
they focus on long-term debt. Martin and Philippon (2017) quantify the importance of
various factors for the crisis dynamics in the euro area–including private-sector deleveraging
and fiscal policy. They rely on a linear semistructural model which combines a basic New
Keynesian framework with ad-hoc rules for fiscal policy and private-sector deleveraging. My
paper differs from the aforementioned studies and from House et al. (2019) as well, in that
I solve the model globally to account for potential nonlinearities in the interaction of public
and private deleveraging. Such nonlinearities are shown to be relevant in my quantitatively
analysis. Moreover, the only nominal rigidity in my model is downward nominal wage rigidity,
whereas in House et al. (2019)’s extended model prices are sticky as well. A model-based
analysis by Batini et al. (2015) also illustrates how private and public deleveraging may
interact. Specifically, they consider a temporary negative house-price shock that reduces the
market value of constrained agents’ collateral. Private borrowers respond to the tightening
of the borrowing constraint by cutting consumption and investment, thus reducing output
and government tax revenues. In the event, the government faces a higher debt-to-GDP
ratio, which in turn raises the sovereign risk premium and its financing costs. Other authors
have taken up the issue of the interaction from an empirical perspective. Baldacci et al.
(2015) study the effects of fiscal consolidations during periods of private deleveraging. Their
sample covers 107 countries and 79 episodes of public debt reduction during the period
1980 to 2012. They find that expenditure-based, front-loaded fiscal adjustments reduce
growth, whereas gradual fiscal adjustments that rely on a mix of revenue and expenditure
measures can support output growth and reduce public debt. Finally, Klein (2017) and
Klein and Winkler (2018) focus on the effects of austerity on income inequality depending
on the level of private debt.
In the analytical part of the paper, I inspect the transmission mechanism of government
spending and deleveraging shocks making some simplifying assumptions. Under a peg, the
contraction in the traded sector can be deleterious. Output and employment can fall sharply
because of the insufficient downward adjustment of the real wage due to the combination
of fixed exchange rate and downward nominal wage rigidity. The optimal devaluation
implemented under a float, by contrast, prevents the contraction in the traded sector to
spill over into the nontraded sector and fully offsets the government spending shock. Then,
I feed in the full model the government spending shocks computed following House et
al. (2019)’s methodology and compute the sequence of deleveraging shocks such that the
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Figure 2.1: Real government spending per capita in Greece during the 1995-2014 period
(normalized to 2009=100). Solid line: actual values, dashed line: predicted values.
model simulations for the shocks interaction track data reasonably well. The main result of
my quantitative analysis is that public deleveraging mostly accounts for the output loss
experienced by Greece and private deleveraging only accounts for a tiny part. However,
the joint occurrence of public and private deleveraging generates quantitatively relevant
nonlinear effects. Overall, the simulations point towards self-defeating austerity, that is,
the debt-to-GDP ratio increases as a result of an endogenous output contraction.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the model.
Section 2.3 describes the shocks transmission mechanism through an analytical example and
derives closed-form results. Next, I solve the full model numerically and present quantitative
results in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Model
The model here described is the deterministic version of the one analyzed in the first
chapter. It features a small open economy with two types of goods. One good is not traded
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internationally, but produced by a representative firm with labor as the only production
factor. Nominal wages are downwardly rigid. The other good is traded internationally by a
representative household. In each period the household receives an endowment of traded
goods and may borrow or lend internationally via non-contingent debt.
Government consumption fluctuates exogenously, is financed through lump-sum taxes,
and falls exclusively on nontraded goods1. Relatively to the model by House et al. (2019), I
only assume wage stickiness but not price stickiness. In addition, in their model wages are
sticky a` la Calvo (1983) rather than a` la Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2016).
2.2.1 Household
There is a representative household endowed with h¯ hours of time, which are inelastically
supplied to the market. The household’s preferences over private and public consumption
are given by
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
c1−σt − 1
1− σ + ψg
(gNt )
1−ς − 1
1− ς
]
, (2.2.1)
where ct denotes private consumption in period t, g
N
t denotes government consumption of
nontraded goods, β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, and σ, ς, and ψg are positive constants
with 1/σ being the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Consumption, in turn, is an aggregate of traded goods, cT , and nontraded goods, cN :
ct =
[
ω
(
cTt
) ξ−1
ξ + (1− ω) (cNt ) ξ−1ξ ] ξξ−1 , (2.2.2)
where ξ is the (intratemporal) elasticity of substitution and ω ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter
governing the weight of traded goods in aggregate consumption. The corresponding
consumer price index (CPI) is given by:
Pt =
[
ωξ
(
P Tt
)1−ξ
+ (1− ω)ξ(PNt )1−ξ] 11−ξ , (2.2.3)
1As explained in the first chapter, the last assumption is meant to enhance the tractability of the model. In
practice governments tend to consume some imports. Yet, their weight in overall government spending is
much smaller than for private spending (see e.g. Corsetti and Mu¨ller, 2006)
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where P Tt and P
N
t denote the domestic-currency price of traded and nontraded goods,
respectively.
The household receives labor income and firm profits as well as an endowment of traded
goods. In addition, the household may borrow (or save) via a discount bond that pays one
unit of the traded goods with a foreign-currency price P T∗t . The household pays taxes and
spends its income on traded and nontraded goods. Formally, the period budget constraint
in domestic currency reads as follows:
EtP T∗t dt + P Tt cTt + PNt cNt = EtP T∗t
dt+1
1 + r
+ P Tt y
T +Wtht + φt − τt , (2.2.4)
where Et is the nominal exchange rate defined as the domestic currency price of one unit
of foreign currency. dt denotes the level of foreign debt assumed in period t− 1, which is
due in period t. Wt is the nominal wage, ht denotes hours worked, φt denotes firm profits,
defined below, and τt denotes lump-sum taxes levied by the government. The world interest
rate r and the endowment of traded output yT are assumed to be exogenous and constant.
I assume that the law of one price holds for traded goods, that is, P Tt = EtP T∗t , and
normalize the foreign-currency price of traded goods to unity: P T∗t = 1. As a result,
the price of traded goods is equal to the exchange rate, P Tt = Et. In addition, I assume
P ∗t /P T∗t = 1, that is, I normalize the foreign relative price of consumption to unity. This
exogeneity assumption is reasonable in the context of my analysis, for I study a small open
economy.
Through its choice of cTt , c
N
t , and dt+1, the representative household maximizes (2.2.1)
subject to (2.2.4), and a no-Ponzi scheme constraint:
dt+1 ≤ d¯t , (2.2.5)
where d¯t is positive. Defining the relative price of nontraded goods, p
N
t ≡ P
N
t
PTt
, the optimality
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conditions of the household are the budget constraint and
cNt : p
N
t =
1− ω
ω
(
cTt
cNt
) 1
ξ
(2.2.6)
cTt : λt = ω
[
ω
(
cTt
) ξ−1
ξ + (1− ω) (cNt ) ξ−1ξ ] ξξ−1 ( 1ξ−σ) (cTt )− 1ξ (2.2.7)
dt+1 :
λt
1 + r
= βλt+1 + µt (2.2.8)
µt ≥ 0 ∧ dt+1 ≤ d¯t with 0 = µt(dt+1 − d¯t) (2.2.9)
as well as a suitable transversality condition for bonds. Here, λt/P
T
t and µt, in turn, are the
Lagrange multipliers associated with (2.2.4) and (2.2.5), and (2.2.9) is the complementary
slackness condition.
2.2.2 Firm
Nontraded output yNt is produced by a representative competitive firm. It operates a
production technology with labor only:
yNt = h
α
t , (2.2.10)
where α ∈ (0, 1]. The firm chooses the amount of labor input to maximize profits φt, taking
wages as given:
φt ≡ PNt yNt −Wtht . (2.2.11)
Optimality requires the following condition to hold:
pNt =
Wt/Et
αyNt /ht
. (2.2.12)
.
63
2.2. Model
2.2.3 Labor market
The household faces no disutility from working and will therefore supply labor in order
to meet labor demand to the extent that it does not exceed the total endowment of labor:
ht ≤ h¯ . (2.2.13)
Hours worked are determined in equilibrium by the firm’s labor demand. Even though
the labor market is competitive, it will generally not clear because of downward nominal
wage rigidity. Specifically, as in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2016), I assume that in any
given period nominal wages cannot fall to a level smaller than γ > 0 times the wage in the
previous period. Formally, the economy is subject to downward nominal wage rigidity of
the form
Wt ≥ γWt−1 . (2.2.14)
As a result, there may be involuntary unemployment. This is captured by the following
complementary slackness condition that must hold in equilibrium for all dates and states:
(h¯− ht)(Wt − γWt−1) = 0 . (2.2.15)
It implies that in periods of unemployment, that is, whenever ht < h¯, the downward
nominal wage rigidity constraint is binding. When the wage constraint is not binding, that
is, whenever Wt > γWt−1, the economy will be at full employment.
In what follows, I use
wt ≡Wt/Et (2.2.16)
to denote the real wage in terms of traded goods and t ≡ EtEt−1 to denote the gross rate of
devaluation of the domestic currency. Equation (2.2.14) can then be rewritten as
wt ≥ γwt−1
t
. (2.2.17)
This expression illustrates that downward nominal wage rigidity operates via effectively
constraining real wages. At the same time, it shows how a currency devaluation, i.e. an
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increase in t, may relax the tightness of the constraint.
2.2.4 Government spending
The government only consumes nontraded goods gNt and finances its expenditure through
a lump-sum tax:
PNt g
N
t = τt . (2.2.18)
Government spending gNt is assumed to follow an exogenous process.
2.2.5 Market clearing
Market clearing in the nontraded-goods sector requires
yNt = c
N
t + g
N
t , (2.2.19)
while the market clearing condition for the traded-goods sector is given by:
cTt = y
T − dt + dt+1
1 + r
. (2.2.20)
Labor market equilibrium is characterized by equations (2.2.13)-(2.2.15). Appendix 2.A
lists the full set of equilibrium conditions and provides a definition of the equilibrium for a
given exchange rate policy {t}∞t=0, to be specified next.
2.2.6 Exchange rate policy
In order to specify the exchange rate policy, I define the full-employment real wage:
wft ≡
1− ω
ω
(
cTt
h¯α − gNt
) 1
ξ
αh¯α−1 . (2.2.21)
This expression is obtained by combining the demand and supply schedules of nontraded
goods, (2.2.6) and (2.2.12), respectively, the definition of the real wage (2.2.16), the produc-
tion technology (2.2.10), and the market clearing condition (2.2.19) when the labor market
is operating at full employment, that is, ht = h¯. This is also the unique real wage associated
with the first-best allocation.
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Whether the actual real wage equals its full-employment counterpart depends on the
nominal exchange rate, as expression (2.2.17) above shows. This gives a role to monetary
policy, which can stabilize economic activity by setting the nominal exchange rate. But there
are infinitely many combinations of nominal wage and nominal exchange rate which imply
the same real wage—see equation (2.2.16) above—and therefore the same real exchange
rate. Hence, any exchange rate policy satisfying
t ≥ γwt−1
wft
(2.2.22)
will make the wage constraint slack and ensure full employment. In what follows, I pick
from this class of full-employment exchange rate policies the one that minimizes movements
in the nominal exchange rate. It is given by
t = max
{
γ
wt−1
wft
, 1
}
. (2.2.23)
Intuitively, if the full-employment wage is above the lower bound γwt−1, the nominal
exchange rate will not be adjusted at all. Otherwise, it will increase by just enough to
alleviate the constraint.
In the analysis below, I study, in addition to the baseline scenario of fixed exchange
rates, the behavior of the economy under “fully” flexible exchange rates. Formally, I specify
the following exchange rate rule (as in Liu (2018)) to capture alternative exchange rate
arrangements:
t = max
{
γ
wt−1
wft
, 1
}φ
, (2.2.24)
with φ ∈ [0, 1]. The case φ = 0 implements a peg, whereas φ = 1 corresponds to a
full-employment stabilizing float (“float”). In general, the smaller φ, the less flexible the
exchange rate.
2.3 Inspecting the mechanism
This section illustrates the transmission mechanism of a negative government spending
shock and a contemporaneous deleveraging shock in a perfect foresight setup. For this
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purpose, I make a number of simplifying assumptions. First, I assume that U(ct) = ln(ct)
and ct = c
T
t c
N
t . Regarding the production function, I assume that α = 1, so that the
marginal product of labor is constant. Without loss of generality, I set yT = 1. The
steady-state level of government consumption is denoted by g < 1. I also assume that
wages are perfectly downwardly rigid, that is, I set γ = 1. In this case, any contractionary
shock is sufficient to induce the wage constraint to become binding. Furthermore, I set
h¯ = 1. Lastly, I assume that initially the economy is in full-employment steady state. Given
the preferences and the functional forms assumed here, I obtain the following equilibrium
conditions:
cTt = 1− dt +
dt+1
1 + r
(2.3.1)
yNt = ht = c
N
t + g
N
t (2.3.2)
(1/cTt )
1 + r
= β(1/cTt+1) + µt (2.3.3)
pNt =
cTt
ht − gNt
(2.3.4)
pNt = wt (2.3.5)
wt ≥ wt−1
t
∧ ht ≤ 1 with 0 = (1− ht)
(
wt − wt−1
t
)
(2.3.6)
wft =
cTt
1− gNt
(2.3.7)
t = max
{
wt−1
wft
, 1
}φ
. (2.3.8)
Both shocks hit the economy at time 0. They are fully unanticipated in the initial
period and everybody understands that no further shocks will ever materialize. Consider
first a permanent negative government spending shock. Specifically, assume the following
process for government spending:
gNt =
g if t < 00 < g < g if t ≥ 0 . (2.3.9)
Consider then a permanent deleveraging shock, that is, a shock that permanently tightens
the borrowing limit. I assume that the borrowing constraint is always binding, so that
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µt > 0 for all t. Specifically, next-period debt evolves according to the following process:
dt+1 =
d¯ if t < 00 < d < d¯ if t ≥ 0 . (2.3.10)
Since the intertemporal consumption choice is decoupled from the intratemporal choice, a
shock to the nontraded sector will not spill over to the traded sector. However, the converse
does not hold in general. In this analytical example, the deleveraging shock reduces traded
consumption on impact: cT0 = 1− d¯+ d1+r < 1− d¯+ d¯1+r = cT−1. In period 0, the nontraded
goods resource constraint (2.3.2) implies cN0 = y
N
0 − g, while equations (2.3.4) and (2.3.5)
imply that the real wage is given by w0 =
cT0
h0−g . Thus, I need to solve for nontraded output
yN0 and hours worked h0, which both depend on the exchange rate arrangement.
Peg (φ = 0): Conjecture that the economy is in a situation of unemployment with
h0 < 1. In this case, the wage constraint (2.3.6) must be binding: w0 =
w−1
0
. Under the
peg, the gross nominal exchange rate devaluation is given by 0 = 1. Consequently, the
real wage is given by w0 =
cT0
h0−g =
cT−1
1−g = w−1, which implies 1− g > h0 − g > h0 − g, as
cT0 < c
T−1. This, in turn, requires h0 < 1, which is true by assumption. This proves that
h0 < 1 indeed is the equilibrium employment level, which is associated with the output
level yN0 = h0 =
cT0
w−1 + g =
1−d¯+ d
1+r
1−( r1+r )d¯
(1− g) + g.
Float (φ = 1): Again conjecture that the economy is in a situation of unemploy-
ment with h0 < 1. The gross nominal exchange rate devaluation follows from (2.3.8) as
0 = max
{
w−1
wf0
, 1
}
= w−1
wf0
=
1−( r1+r )d¯
1−d¯+ d
1+r
· 1−g1−g . The assumption that h0 < 1 therefore leads
to a contradiction: w0 =
cT0
h0−g =
cT0
1−g = w
f
0 , which requires h0 − g = 1− g, that is, h0 = 1.
Consequently, it must be that yN0 = h0 = 1 and the economy is at its full-employment
equilibrium.
From (2.3.4) then follows that pN0,peg = w0 = w−1 = pN−1 and pN0,f loat =
cT0
1−g <
cT−1
1−g = p
N−1,
since 1−g1−g <
cT−1
cT0
. Hence, the two shocks cause a fall in pN under a float but not under a peg.
Moreover, these equations show how harmful the contraction in the traded sector can be.
The full-employment real wage wf potentially falls a lot depending on the drop in traded
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consumption cT (and government consumption gN ), as
wf0
wf−1
=
cT0
cT−1
1−g
1−g < 1. By contrast,
the real wage wt stays put. The lack of downward adjustment in the real wage which would
be necessary to ensure full employment is due to the combination of downward nominal
wage rigidity and a peg and to the assumptions made in this analytical example. Therefore,
the lack of adjustment causes disequilibrium in the labor market. The optimal devaluation,
by contrast, prevents the contraction in the traded sector to spill over into the nontraded
sector and offsets the government spending shock as well.
Figure 2.2 illustrates these results graphically. In the left panel, I show the effect of
a deleveraging shock for a given g. Traded consumption declines and so does the full-
employment real wage. This decline is exacerbated by the negative government spending
shock, shown in the right panel. The initial equilibrium is given by point A, the intersection
of the supply curve and the downward-sloping demand curve. Following the government
spending shock, the demand for nontraded goods declines. The real wage cannot adjust
downward under the peg because of perfect downward wage rigidity. This brings about
involuntary unemployment and a permanently lower level of output (point “peg”). In
case of a float, the nominal exchange rate depreciates, driving the real wage down to the
full-employment equilibrium (point “float”). Hence, the level of output remains unaffected
by the shock(s).
In section 2.4 below, I solve the full model numerically using global methods that allow
to capture nonlinear adjustment dynamics.
2.4 Quantitative analysis
I now solve the full model numerically using two global methods, as explained in greater
detail below.
I calibrate the model to capture key features of the Greek economy. I largely follow
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2016)’s calibration—except in those instances where I explicitly
account for government spending.
2.4.1 Model calibration and solution
Table 2.1 summarizes the parameters of the model together with the values that I assign
to them in our numerical analysis. A period in the model corresponds to one quarter. In
the model, I abstract from both foreign inflation and long-run technology growth, which
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Figure 2.2: The effect of permanent deleveraging and government spending shocks starting
from full employment.
mitigate the effect of downward nominal wage rigidity. Following Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe
(2016), I adjust the value of γ for Greece provided in their paper by the average quarterly
inflation rate in Germany (0.3% per quarter) and the average growth rate of per capita
GDP in the euro periphery (0.3%). I set γ to 0.9982/(1.003× 1.003) = 0.9922. I set the
intra- and intertemporal elasticities of substitution between traded and nontraded goods, ξ
and σ, to 0.44 and 5, respectively, following again Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2016) and
Reinhart and Ve´gh (1995). In line with the estimate of Uribe (1997), I fix the labor share
in the traded goods sector at α = 0.75. I set d¯ = 87.3136, i.e. for numerical reasons I set
the upper limit 5% below the natural debt limit. I normalize the endowment of hours h¯ to
unity. The subjective discount factor β is set to 0.9375, in line with Schmitt-Grohe´ and
Uribe (2016), to obtain a plausible foreign debt-to-GDP ratio.
Finally, the weight of traded goods in aggregate consumption is determined by ω. I set
it to 0.37. This implies an average share of traded goods in total output of 26 percent, in
line with the calibration target by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2016).
In order to solve the model, I largely follow Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2016). In case
of a float, φ = 1, the lagged real wage is not a state variable and the resulting program
coincides with the central planner’s solution. This simplifies the analysis considerably and
I solve the model numerically by value function iteration over a discretized state space.
In case of a fixed exchange rate regime, that is, if φ = 0, the lagged real wage is a state
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Table 2.1: Parameter values used in model simulation
Parameter Value Source/Target
Wage rigidity γ = 0.9922 SGU (2016)
Elasticity of substitution ξ = 0.44 SGU (2016)
Risk aversion, private consumption σ = 5 Standard value
Labor exponent production function α = 0.75 Uribe (1997)
Debt limit d¯ = 87.3136 95 % of natural debt limit
Endowment of hours worked h¯ = 1 Normalization
Interest rate r = 0.011 Average interest rate
Traded goods endowment yT = 1 Normalization
Discount factor β = 0.9375 SGU (2016)
Weight on traded goods in CES ω = 0.37 traded goods share of 0.26
variable, as is the external debt position. To solve the model in this case, I resort to Euler
equation iteration.
2.4.2 Government spending shocks and measures of economic performance
To compute government spending shocks, I follow the methodology explained in detail
by House et al. (2019)2. More precisely, I adopt the following forecast specification:
lnGt = lnGt−1 + gˆEU + γˆ(ln YˆEU,t−1 − lnYt−1) + εGt . (2.4.1)
lnGt is the log of real government spending (deflated by the GDP deflator) at time t,
lnYt is the log of real nontraded output at time t and the parameter gEU is the average
growth rate of output in Europe. The hat denotes a predicted value of the variable. This
forecast specification accounts for both average output growth and convergence dynamics.
The underlying assumption is that all countries are converging to a common growth rate.
The forecasting equation 2.4.1 requires estimates of gEU , the convergence parameter γ
and predicted values for average log real output in Europe ln YˆEU,t−1. These estimates are
based on data up to 2005, thereby excluding the boom before the Great Recession. To
2My data source is Eurostat. The sample covers the period 1960-2014. See the Appendix for sources of all
time series used.
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estimate gEU and ln YˆEU,t−1 I use annual data for twelve advanced euro area economies3
over 1993-2005 using the specification
lnYEU,t = βEU + gEU · t+ εEU,t. (2.4.2)
The estimated value for gEU is 0.019 (i.e., 1.9 percent annual growth) with a standard error
of 0.0012. ln YˆEU,t are the fitted values from 2.4.2. To estimate the convergence parameter
γ I run the regression
gt − gˆEU = γ(ln YˆEU,t−1 − lnYt−1) + εγt . (2.4.3)
The estimated value for γ is 0.023 with a standard error of 0.002. In addition to the
forecast for government spending, I compute two measures of economic performance: the
debt-to-GDP ratio and real GDP. The forecast for the foreign debt-to-GDP ratio dˆt for
dates t after 2009 is
dˆt =
1
2
2009∑
s=2008
ds. (2.4.4)
Finally, I adopt the following specification for nontraded output:
lnYt = lnYt−1 + gˆEU + γˆ(ln YˆEU,t−1 − lnYt−1) + εYt . (2.4.5)
As with the forecast for government spending, this forecast specification accounts for both
average output growth and convergence dynamics. The parameters gEU and γ are estimated
over the 1993-2005 period using quarterly data and ln YˆEU,t−1 is the fitted values from 2.4.2.
Once estimated the deviations of government spending from their forecasts over the
years 2010-14, the period of interest, I treat those deviations as shocks and feed them
into the model. For the year 2010, I use the actual realizations of lnG2009 and lnY2009 in
equation 2.4.1. Starting from 2011, I replace lnGt−1 and lnYt−1 with their predicted values.
As for equation 2.4.5, up to t = 2010:1 I use actual output data for lnYi,t−1 and replace it
with its forecast ln Yˆi,t−1 thereafter. Since the model is calibrated at quarterly frequency, I
use Chow and Lin (1971)’s method to convert the predicted annual government spending
series to quarterly series. As an auxiliary high-frequency indicator, I rely exclusively on
3Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Austria, Netherlands, Portugal,
and Finland.
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real quarterly output. Moreover, given that the model is cast in terms of traded output,
I divide the government spending series by average output in the pre-crisis period—i.e.
the 1993-2005 period—and adjust it to account for the government spending share being
expressed in total output. The government spending shocks fed into the model are then the
deviations of actual government spending from its predicted quarterly level.
Alternatively, I could use the following forecast specification for real government spending,
which includes contemporaneous output and therefore a feedback mechanism in equation
2.4.1:
lnGt = lnGt−1 + gˆEU + γˆ(ln YˆEU,t−1 − lnYt−1) + θG(lnYt − ln YˆEU,t) + εGt . (2.4.6)
I estimate the cyclicality parameter θG by least squares using all available data up to 2005.
The estimated value is 0.38 with a standard error of 0.06.
As shown in figure 2.3, using a linear or a quadratic trend rather than House et al.
(2019)’s methodology to compute forecast errors would yield a less substantial amount of
austerity over the 2010-14 period.
2.4.3 Model and data comparison
In addition to the government spending shocks, I consider the additional effect of
exogenous deleveraging shocks in the private sector. More specifically, I feed in the model
government spending shocks and compute the series of deleveraging shocks such that model
simulations for the shocks interaction track the data reasonably well. Figure 2.4 displays the
model impulse responses to the government spending shocks, the deleveraging shocks, and
the interaction of the shocks under a peg. In this figure, the solid blue lines represent the
responses to the government spending shock, the dashed red lines represent the responses to
the deleveraging shock, the solid gray lines represent the interaction, and the dotted black
lines correspond to actual data. The model simulations track the data reasonably well.
The government spending shocks induce a large contraction in nontraded output through
the mechanism described in Section 2.3. The additional deleveraging shocks, which lower
traded consumption and therefore spill over to the nontraded sector, initially reduce output
but also dampen the increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio. The output contraction is very
mild, when compared to government spending shocks, and very transitory. This happens
for the following reasons. The magnitude of the deleveraging shock in percentage points is
about one fourth of the spending shock on impact. Moreover, the spending shocks increase
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Figure 2.3: Real government spending per capita in Greece during the 1995-2014 period
(normalized to 2009=100). Solid line: actual values, red dashed: prediction using House et
al. (2019)’s methodology, green dashed: prediction using House et al. (2019)’s forecasting
equation 2.4.6, gray solid: linear trend, black dotted: quadratic trend.
considerably in size over the time horizon, as opposed to deleveraging shocks, which fade
away at the end of the horizon. In a perfect foresight setup, agents know at time 0 that
deleveraging shocks are only transitory and government spending shocks are permanent.
Therefore, the contraction in the traded sector has a limited and temporary impact on
the mismatch between full-employment and actual real wage and ultimately on the labor
market whereas in response to the government spending shocks the economy enters a
permanent state of depression. Overall, austerity is so contractionary that the debt-to-GDP
ratio increases as a consequence of an endogenous output reduction. Public deleveraging
contributes on average almost 92 percent to the nontraded output contraction, whereas the
contribution of private deleveraging is about 1 percent. The remaining 7 percent is due to
the nonlinear effects stemming from the interaction of the shocks which makes both the
wage constraint and the debt constraint binding.
In a second experiment, I consider the counterfactual scenario of fully flexible exchange
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Figure 2.4: Model responses to government spending shock, deleveraging shock, and joint
shocks and data comparison under peg. First row: government spending and debt. Second
row: nontraded output and debt-to-GDP ratio. Solid blue line: austerity, dashed red:
deleveraging, dashed gray: interaction, dotted: data. Horizontal axis measures time in
quarters, vertical axis measures the effect of shock in pp for government spending, debt
and the debt-to-GDP ratio and in percent deviation from the mean for nontraded output.
‘Data’ refers to forecast errors from regression (2.4.5) for nontraded output and regression
(2.4.4) for the debt-to-GDP ratio.
rates, that is, a float. This exchange rate regime is designed in such a way that the nominal
exchange rate can adjust every period so as to ensure full employment in the labor market.
For this reason, Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2016) refer to this regime as the “optimal
exchange rate policy”. This specific adjustment of the exchange rate may be difficult
to bring about in practice, either because of external constraints like having given up
independent monetary policy or domestic ones like monetary policy having other objectives.
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In my counterfactual experiment, I operate under the assumption that Greece has withdrawn
from the euro area, thereby restoring monetary policy independence, and abstract from
other objectives that may prevent the central bank to pursue full employment. Figure 2.5
shows the model responses to the joint occurrence of public and private deleveraging under
peg and float and actual data. The float fully stabilizes nontraded output through a strong
currency depreciation. Moreover, the optimal devaluation prevents the contraction in the
traded sector to spill over into the nontraded sector. The debt-to-GDP ratio is much lower
than it is under the peg. Eventually this ratio increases as a consequence of a massive fall
in the relative price of nontradables. To take a closer look, figure 2.6 shows the effect on
price of traded goods, nontraded goods and the CPI in levels. The responses shown in
the previous figures are the difference between actual (blue lines) and predicted (red lines)
values. On impact the price of tradables jumps, that is, there is depreciation of the nominal
exchange rate. The price of nontradables, however, declines more strongly, which results in
deflation. Under a peg, as shown in figure 2.7, the price of traded goods does not change
and the price of nontraded goods moves by less than it does under a float. The result is
milder deflation.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I have analyzed the effects of public and private deleveraging in Greece
during the 2010-14 period, as Greece stands out as having the sharpest decline in GDP
and government spending over this period. First, I establish the contribution of public
deleveraging relative to private deleveraging under the peg. Second, I run a counterfactual
experiment to study the dynamics in a float scenario. According to the model simulations,
austerity mostly accounts for the large output contraction experienced by the country.
The nonlinear effects generated by the joint occurrence of public and private deleveraging
are quantitatively relevant. Overall, the model simulations point towards self-defeating
austerity, that is, the debt-to-GDP ratio increases as a result of an endogenous output
contraction.
76
2.5. Conclusion
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
-24
-22
-20
-18
-16
-14
-12
-10
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
Peg
Float
Data
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Figure 2.5: Model responses to joint shocks under peg and float and data comparison. First
row: government spending and debt. Second row: nontraded output and debt-to-GDP ratio.
Solid blue line: austerity, dashed red: deleveraging, dotted: data. Horizontal axis measures
time in quarters, vertical axis measures the effect of shock in pp for government spending,
debt and the debt-to-GDP ratio and in percent deviation from the mean for nontraded
output. ‘Data’ refers to forecast errors from regression (2.4.5) for nontraded output and
regression (2.4.4) for the debt-to-GDP ratio.
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Figure 2.6: Responses of prices and CPI under float. Solid line: actual values, dashed line:
predicted values.
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Figure 2.7: Responses of prices and CPI under peg. Solid line: actual values, dashed line:
predicted values.
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Appendix
2.A Full set of equilibrium conditions
The Lagrangean reads:
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt
{

([
ω
(
cTt
) ξ−1
ξ + (1− ω) (cNt ) ξ−1ξ ] ξξ−1
)1−σ
− 1
1− σ + ψg
(gNt )
1−ς − 1
1− ς

− λt/P Tt
[
EtP T∗t dt + P Tt cTt + PNt cNt − EtP T∗t
dt+1
1 + r
− P Tt yT −Wtht − φt + τt
]}
− µt(dt+1 − d¯).
The first-order conditions are:
∂L
∂cNt
:
PNt
P Tt
− 1− ω
ω
(
cTt
cNt
) 1
ξ
= 0 (2.A.1)
∂L
∂cTt
: λt − ω
[
ω
(
cTt
) ξ−1
ξ + (1− ω) (cNt ) ξ−1ξ ] ξξ−1 ( 1ξ−σ) (cTt )− 1ξ = 0 (2.A.2)
∂L
∂dt+1
: λt
EtP T∗t
P Tt
1
1 + r
− βλt+1
Et+1P T∗t+1
P Tt+1
− µt = 0 (2.A.3)
∂L
∂λt/P Tt
: EtP T∗t dt + P Tt cTt + PNt cNt − EtP T∗t
dt+1
1 + r
− P Tt yT −Wtht − φt + τt = 0.
(2.A.4)
Using the assumptions that P Tt = Et and P T∗t = 1 and the definition of relative price
pNt ≡ P
N
t
PTt
, (2.A.1)-(2.A.3) become:
pNt −
1− ω
ω
(
cTt
cNt
) 1
ξ
= 0
λt − ω
[
ω
(
cTt
) ξ−1
ξ + (1− ω) (cNt ) ξ−1ξ ] ξξ−1 ( 1ξ−σ) (cTt )− 1ξ = 0
λt
1 + r
− βλt+1 + µt.
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In addition, using the definition of firm profits φt ≡ PNt yNt −Wtht, the process for government
spending PNt g
N
t = τt, and the market clearing condition for nontraded goods y
N
t = c
N
t + g
N
t ,
(2.A.4) becomes the market clearing condition for traded goods:
P Tt dt + P
T
t c
T
t + P
N
t c
N
t − P Tt
dt+1
1 + r
− P Tt yT −Wtht − φt + τt = 0
P Tt dt + P
T
t c
T
t + P
N
t c
N
t − P Tt
dt+1
1 + r
− P Tt yT −Wtht − (PNt yNt −Wtht) + PNt gNt = 0
P Tt dt + P
T
t c
T
t + P
N
t c
N
t − P Tt
dt+1
1 + r
− P Tt yT −Wtht − PNt (cNt + gNt ) +Wtht + PNt gNt = 0
P Tt dt + P
T
t c
T
t − P Tt
dt+1
1 + r
− P Tt yT = 0
dt + c
T
t −
dt+1
1 + r
− yT = 0.
Definition 2.1. An equilibrium is defined as a set of deterministic processes {cTt , ht, dt+1, wt, λt, µt, }∞t=0
satisfying
cTt = y
T − dt + dt+1
1 + r
(2.A.5)
λt = ω
[
ω(cTt )
ξ−1
ξ + (1− ω)(hαt − gNt )
ξ−1
ξ
] ξ
ξ−1 (
1
ξ
−σ)
(cTt )
− 1
ξ (2.A.6)
λt
1 + r
= βλt+1 + µt (2.A.7)
µt ≥ 0 ∧ dt+1 ≤ d¯t with 0 = µt(dt+1 − d¯t) (2.A.8)
wt
αhα−1t
=
1− ω
ω
(
cTt
hαt − gNt
) 1
ξ
(2.A.9)
wt ≥ γwt−1
t
(2.A.10)
ht ≤ h¯ (2.A.11)
0 = (h¯− ht)
(
wt − γwt−1
t
)
, (2.A.12)
as well as a suitable transversality condition, given initial conditions {w−1, d0}, exogenous
deterministic processes {gNt , d¯t}∞t=0, and an exchange rate policy {t}∞t=0.
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2.B Data sources
• Government consumption (annual data): Eurostat. GDP and main components
(output, expenditure and income) [nama 10 gdp], Chain linked volumes (2010), mil-
lion units of national currency. Final consumption expenditure of general government.
Extracted on 19.04.19.
• Net external debt (annual/quarterly data): Eurostat. Main Balance of Pay-
ments and International Investment Position items as share of GDP (BPM6) [bop gdp6 q].
Percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). Unadjusted data (i.e. neither seasonally
adjusted nor calendar adjusted data). Net external debt. Net liabilities (liabilities
minus assets). Rest of the world. Extracted on 11.11.19.
• Real nontraded output (annual data): Eurostat. Gross value added and income
A*10 industry breakdowns [nama 10 a10]. Sectors: Industry (except construction),
Construction, Financial and insurance activities, Real estate activities, Professional,
scientific and technical activities; administrative and support service activities, Public
administration, defence, education, human health and social work activities, Arts,
entertainment and recreation; other service activities; activities of household and
extra-territorial organizations and bodies. Chain linked volumes (2010), million euro.
Seasonally and calendar adjusted data. Value added, gross. Extracted on 26.02.19.
• Real nontraded output (quarterly data): Eurostat. Gross value added and
income A*10 industry breakdowns [namq 10 a10]. Sectors: Industry (except con-
struction), Construction, Financial and insurance activities, Real estate activities,
Professional, scientific and technical activities; administrative and support service
activities, Public administration, defence, education, human health and social work
activities, Arts, entertainment and recreation; other service activities; activities of
household and extra-territorial organizations and bodies. Chain linked volumes (2010),
million euro. Seasonally and calendar adjusted data. Value added, gross. Extracted
on 26.02.19.
• Population (annual data): Eurostat. Population on 1 January by age and sex
[demo pjan]. Total. Extracted on 19.04.19.
• Real effective exchange rate (annual data): Eurostat. Industrial countries’
effective exchange rates - quarterly data [ert eff ic a], Real effective exchange rate
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(deflator: consumer price index - 19 trading partners - euro area), Index, 2010=100.
Extracted on 31.07.18.
• Real effective exchange rate (quarterly data): Eurostat. Industrial countries’
effective exchange rates - quarterly data [ert eff ic q], Real effective exchange rate
(deflator: consumer price index - 19 trading partners - euro area), Index, 2010=100.
Extracted on 31.07.18.
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Chapter 3
Joint deleveraging in the public and private sector:
a review of the macroeconomic effects
3.1 Introduction
How strong is the interaction of public and private deleveraging? In order to address
this question, this paper presents a critical review of the literature assessing the individual
and joint effects of debt deleveraging in the public and in the private sector, as they have
been widely debated in the context of the euro-area crisis. Moreover, they are conceptually
closely related and likely to interact in important ways. In both instances, efforts to reduce
the level of borrowing may raise the level of debt relative to current GDP because of their
contractionary effect on economic activity. This analysis is particularly relevant in light of
the following four observations:
1. Macroeconomic performance in the euro area is very heterogeneous after 2009. While
the macroeconomic performance of the euro area as a whole has been rather poor,
there are striking differences across countries. The upper-left panel of Figure 3.1
displays the unemployment rate in selected countries of the euro area: the southern
“peripheral” countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and two “core” countries
(Germany and France). Unemployment rates reached record levels in Spain and
Greece, but remained moderate in Germany throughout the crisis.
2. Public-sector deleveraging and unemployment rates are correlated. Those countries
which suffered from a strong increase in unemployment also implemented large
austerity measures in the period after 2009. The upper-right panel of Figure 3.1
relates annual changes in the cyclically adjusted primary fiscal balance to the change
in the unemployment rate (in the peripheral countries). The correlation is striking.
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3. Private-sector deleveraging and unemployment rates are correlated. Those countries
which suffered from a strong increase in unemployment rates experienced sizable
private-sector deleveraging. The lower-left panel of Figure 3.1 relates the annual
reduction in private credit to the change in the unemployment rate. The correlation
is smaller than in the upper-right panel, but still large.
4. Fiscal adjustment in Europe is mostly expenditure-based. As shown by Alesina
et al. (2015b) and reproduced in the lower-right panel of Figure 3.1, the share of
expenditure-based (EB) fiscal adjustments has been significantly larger than the share
of tax-based (TB) adjustments in most countries.
There is evidence that cuts to government spending are less costly in terms of output losses
than tax increases. The difference is likely to be even stronger in economies which are
subject to private-sector deleveraging. Specifically, it is possible that the composition of
fiscal adjustments interacts with private-sector deleveraging in important ways. This is
likely to have first-order implications for welfare and the optimal design of fiscal adjustments.
Consider, for instance, a government consumption cut. To the extent that it has deflationary
effects, it raises the real burden of debt, thereby redistributing wealth from borrowers to
savers. A likely consequence is that both deleveraging and inequality intensify. A cut to
unemployment benefits, in contrast, has an immediate re-distributional effect, but is likely
less detrimental to economic activity–unless the highly indebted individuals are also the
unemployed.
The focus of section 3.2 is on the output and unemployment effects of public-sector
deleveraging, as well as its welfare and distributional consequences. Section 3.3 deals with
the macroeconomic effects of private-sector deleveraging, but also how the presence of
financial frictions, in the form of borrowing constraints, affects macroeconomic dynamics.
Section 3.4 focuses on both factors jointly, since they are conceptually closely related and
likely to interact in such a way that potentially adverse dynamics are reinforcing each other.
Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Public-sector deleveraging
3.2.1 State of the economy and macroeconomic performance
As “public-sector deleveraging” I define efforts by governments to reduce borrowing
levels. This may include cuts to government spending and transfer payments or tax hikes
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Figure 3.1: Upper-left panel: unemployment rate in selected euro area countries. Upper-
right panel: annual change in unemployment rate (horizontal axis) against annual change
in the cyclically adjusted primary balance, expressed in percentage of potential GDP
(vertical axis), both measured in percentage points. Lower-left panel: annual change in
unemployment rate (horizontal axis) against annual reduction in consolidated private sector
credit flow, expressed in percentage of potential GDP (vertical axis), both measured in
percentage points. Lower-right panel: share of expenditure-based (EB) and tax-based (TB)
fiscal adjustments, weighted for size of consolidation. Sources: Eurostat, OECD Economic
Outlook No 100, November 2016 and Alesina et al. (2015b).
(“fiscal adjustment/consolidation” or “austerity” for short). The focus of this section is
on austerity, as to date it remains a highly controversial topic in the academic and policy
debate (see, for instance, Alesina et al. (2019)). The complexity of the issue is such that
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economists disagree on the size and even on the sign of the effects on GDP. For instance,
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013) find negative multipliers during expansions. Alesina et
al. (2019) present a synopsis of studies estimating government spending multipliers: most of
the values range between 0.6 and 1.5. As for tax multipliers, the interval of estimates is even
wider, ranging from -0.5 in Evans (1969) to -5.25 in Mountford and Uhlig (2009). These
estimates are summarized in Table 3.1. Gechert (2015) applies a meta-regression analysis to
a dataset of 104 studies on multiplier effects across a variety of countries and using different
statistical techniques. He finds that spending multipliers are close to 1 and about 0.3 to 0.4
units larger than tax and transfer multipliers. Variations in public investment have even
larger multiplier effects than those of spending in general by approximately 0.5 units. The
effects of fiscal adjustments on the macroeconomy certainly represent a topical issue in view
of the recent experience of the euro area. Furthermore, lack of conclusive evidence in this
regard keeps alive the everlasting debate about the real extent of austerity. According to
many observers (see, for instance, Blyth (2013) and some authors in Konzelmann (2014)),
austerity measures have been excessive and are responsible for the poor macroeconomic
performance observed in those countries. Dawn and Portes (2012) show that coordinated
fiscal consolidation in EU countries during the Great Contraction has had larger negative
impacts on growth than expected and raised rather than lowered debt-to-GDP ratios. Other
authors take the opposite view (see Alesina and Giavazzi (2013)). More specifically, there
is lack of consensus regarding the appropriate timing and composition of austerity. Some
authors have argued that sharp fiscal adjustments may make recessions shorter and less
painful (see for instance Clinton et al. (2012) and Guajardo et al. (2014)). Others advocate
a more gradual approach and support the view that delaying fiscal consolidation until
the economy starts recovering is preferable (see Blanchard and Leigh (2013); Corsetti et
al. (2010); DeLong and Summers (2012); Fletcher and Sandri (2015)). Importantly, the
appropriate timing of austerity may vary on a country-by-country basis. To be more precise,
it depends on conditions such as the risk of sovereign default. The appropriate composition
of austerity measures is also a subject of debate. While Alesina and Giavazzi in their
numerous contributions view spending cuts as less recessionary, Blyth (2013) argues that
tax increases are highly preferable.
Austerity differs from conventional fiscal policy measures in that it is typically undertaken
under special circumstances and on a larger scale. In this regard, the finding that government
spending multipliers tend to be larger during recessions than during booms is particularly
noteworthy and has received much attention (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2013)).
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Yet, it remains controversial to date. In particular, Ramey and Zubairy (2018) show
that high multipliers during recessions might be due to data inconsistent assumptions.
Using local projection methods a` la Jorda` (2005), they find no evidence of high spending
multipliers during high unemployment states. Crucially, they demonstrate that most of
the differences between their work and that of Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) stem
from nonlinear impulse response functions, on which the multipliers are based. Notably,
Blanchard and Leigh (2013) put forward the hypothesis that fiscal multipliers changed after
the crisis. Alesina et al. (2015b) reject this hypothesis on the ground that they find no
significant effect of fiscal shocks on the forecast errors for output growth. In contrast, there
is little doubt that multipliers are larger in situations when the zero lower bound on interest
rates constrains monetary policy (e.g., Christiano et al. (2011)), even though some authors
(e.g., Ramey and Zubairy (2018)) find mixed evidence on the size of the multiplier at the
zero lower bound. Corsetti et al. (2012b) assess additional determinants of the government
spending multiplier and find it particularly large during financial crises–in line with other
results on the role of borrowing constraints for the fiscal transmission mechanism (Bilbiie
et al. (2008))–as well as in case the exchange rate is fixed. Noteworthy in this regard is the
analysis of Born et al. (2013). They find empirical evidence for 17 OECD countries that
government spending multipliers are considerably larger under fixed exchange rate regimes
and that a small open economy New Keynesian model provides a satisfactory account of
the evidence. Spending multipliers change depending on other factors, such as the health
of public finances and the occurrence of a financial crisis. Ilzetzki et al. (2013) show also
that multipliers in closed economies are larger than in open economies, they are larger in
industrial than in developing countries, and negative in high-debt countries. In earlier work,
Corsetti et al. (2013b, 2014) investigated to what extent the presence of sovereign default
risk–often the trigger of fiscal adjustments–impacts the fiscal transmission mechanism. It
turns out that how sovereign default risk, as reflected in default premia, impacts the fiscal
multiplier is ambiguous from a theoretical point of view. Born et al. (2019) take up the
issue empirically and find government spending multipliers to be larger in the presence of
sovereign risk. In a related study, Bandeira et al. (2018) consider a two-country model of a
currency union and establish that in a low inflation environment, contrary to what happens
in normal times, fiscal adjustment has a negative effect on demand and the private sector is
not able to absorb the heightened number of jobseekers. There is thus plenty of evidence
that the fiscal multiplier is state-dependent. The timing of austerity is therefore crucial.
This is also illustrated by Corsetti et al. (2010) and Corsetti et al. (2012b). Specifically, they
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have shown that the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus is increased considerably if it induces
expectations of future spending restraint. Key in this regard is that spending restraint is
expected to take place not before the effective lower bound on nominal interest rate ceases
to bind. More recently, House et al. (2019) show that cross-country differences in austerity
measures account for a large share of the observed cross-sectional variation in output in
advanced economies during the period 2010-2014. Moreover, counterfactual experiments
suggest that, without austerity, output losses in Europe would have been substantially
lower. Overall, we may conclude that cuts in government spending have, at least at times,
adverse effects on macroeconomic performance.
In addition to the state of the economy, the composition of fiscal adjustments also
matters for how it impacts macroeconomic performance. Macroeconomic performance,
measured by either unemployment or output, is of interest in its own right. It also matters,
however, for the success of fiscal adjustments, as it is frequently assessed in terms of the
change of the debt-to-GDP ratio (e.g. Mu¨ller (2014b)). Using the narrative approach
introduced by Romer and Romer (2010) in order to identify fiscal shocks, tax hikes are
found to be much more detrimental to economic activity than spending cuts (see Alesina
and Ardagna (2010), Alesina et al. (2015a), Alesina et al. (2015b), Alesina et al. (2017) and
Alesina et al. (2018b)). Guajardo et al. (2014) confirm this finding, although the difference
between spending cuts and tax hikes is less stark according to their estimates. In particular,
Alesina et al. (2015a) argue that the effects of fiscal consolidations should be evaluated
on the basis of multi-year fiscal plans, rather than on individual fiscal shocks, in order
to control for anticipation effects. Using this approach1, Alesina et al. (2015b) show that
there was significant heterogeneity in the effects of austerity policies over the years 2009-13
depending on their composition, but remain silent on the optimality of such adjustments,
as this would require a structural model. Alesina et al. (2018b) find that the composition
of fiscal adjustments is more relevant than the state of the economy in determining output
effects, that is, adjustments based upon permanent spending cuts are consistently much
less costly than those based upon permanent tax increases. Using an extended narrative
dataset2, Alesina et al. (2017) find that government spending and transfer cuts reduce
output by less than tax hikes. A standard New Keynesian closed economy model with
1The model estimated in Alesina et al. (2015a) uses data up to 2007. Alesina et al. (2015b) simulate the
model over the years 2009-13 feeding in the actual fiscal plans implemented by ten EU countries and by
the United States in those years.
2Devries et al. (2011)’s dataset is extended by collecting additional information on every fiscal measure,
specifying details on its legislative source for a total of about 3500 measures over the entire sample.
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distorting taxes matches these results when fiscal shocks are persistent. The mechanism is
as follows: the rising wealth effect on aggregate demand dampens the impact of a persistent
cut in government spending, whereas static labor distortions caused by persistent wage
tax hikes induce larger shifts in aggregate supply under sticky prices. Erceg and Linde´
(2013) perform a model-based analysis of the effects of tax-based versus expenditure-based
consolidations in a currency union. Tax-based consolidations turn out to be more costly
than expenditure-based ones in the long term, but the opposite holds in the short run.
Batini et al. (2012) perform a model-based analysis of the optimal timing and composition
of fiscal consolidations and find, instead, that a gradual fiscal adjustment relying on a mix
of expenditure cuts and tax increases is more likely to rapidly reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio
than a front-loaded one. Moreover, a sharp but temporary increase of taxes accompanied
by gradual spending cuts may be desirable in terms of minimizing the output costs of
consolidations. Bianchi et al. (2019) investigate the short-run and medium-run consequences
of the austerity measures taken in European countries in the context of a two-country
model with endogenous technology adoption. They find negative effects on productivity
and output, as well as on capital and investment in the adoption of new technologies, which
leads to a deeper recession in the short run and a slower recovery. In particular, the negative
effects are the strongest when consolidation relies on a labor tax.
3.2.2 The issue of identification
To estimate the causal effects of austerity on the economy, one needs to identify
exogenous shifts in fiscal variables, that is, changes in government spending and/or taxes
which are not dictated by the cycle or motivated by the need to stimulate the economy.
Many techniques have been developed to deal with the identification of the effects of shifts
in spending or taxes. The Vector Autoregression (VAR) approach, adopted for the first time
by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), was one of the first approaches used to identify exogenous
shifts in fiscal variables. VARs consist of a system of multiple dynamic equations which
are jointly estimated. The residuals in the estimated equations for the policy variables
approximate deviations of these variables from a rule. Such deviations, however, also contain
the contemporaneous response of fiscal policy to the cycle. In order to measure the effects
of exogenous shifts in policy, one needs to back out structural shocks from VAR innovations.
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) recover discretionary policy changes in two steps. First, they
purge out “the automatic stabilization component” from the VAR innovation relying on
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Table 3.1: Selected estimates of spending and tax multipliers on output
Study Sample Identification Spending Taxes
Evans (1969) Quarterly, 1966-74 Based on estimates
of equations of
Wharton, Klein-
Goldberger, and
Brookings models
-0.5 to -1.7, de-
pending on horizon,
type of tax, and
model
Blanchard and Perotti
(2002)
Quarterly, 1960-67 SVAR, Choleski
decomposition
with G ordered
first
0.9 to 1.29 (peak
multipliers)
-0.78 to -1.33 (peak
to impact)
Mountford and Uhlig
(2009)
Quarterly, 1955-
2000
Sign restrictions on
a SVAR
0.65 for a deficit-
financed increase in
spending
-5.25 for a tax
decrease that is
deficit-financed
Romer and Romer (2010) Quarterly, 1947-
2007
Legislated tax
changes, narrative
evidence
-3 (peak)
Barro and Redlick (2011) Annual historical
samples
Military spending
as instrument for
government spend-
ing
0.6 to 1 -1.1
Ramey (2011b) Quarterly, 1939-
2008 and subsam-
ples
Military shocks,
narrative evidence
0.6 to 1.2, depend-
ing on sample
Auerbach and Gorod-
nichenko (2013)
Quarterly, 1947-
2008
SVAR that con-
trols for profes-
sional forecasts,
Ramey news,
regime switching
model
Expansion: -0.3.
Recession: 2.2. (-
0.4 and 1.7 for de-
fense spending)
Notes: This table is adapted from Ramey (2016)
92
3.2. Public-sector deleveraging
institutional information about the automatic response of transfer, spending, and taxes
to the state of the economy. Second, they assume that it takes at least one quarter for
fiscal policy to react to the state of the economy, so that there is no discretionary deviation
from the rule. With these shocks at hand, one can trace their impact on macroeconomic
variables. Importantly, it should be noted that the exogenous fiscal shifts crucially depend
on the particular specification of the model, that is, a misspecification due to the omission
of relevant variables could contaminate innovations. Moreover, the exogeneity of the policy
shifts extracted from innovations in policy variables rests on a specific assumption; for
instance, on the assumption that it takes at least one quarter for the fiscal authority to
respond to the state of the economy. Another drawback of the VAR approach relates to
fiscal foresight, that is, if fiscal policy measures are anticipated, it is difficult to recover
structural shocks from VAR innovations3. The quantitative relevance of this argument is,
however, unclear, as controlling for anticipation seems not to have a significant impact on
the results (see, for instance, Corsetti et al. (2013b); Born et al. (2013)).
An early literature tried to identify exogenous fiscal adjustments using a cyclically
adjusted measure of the deficit (e.g., Alesina and Ardagna (2010, 2013); Giavazzi and
Pagano (1990)). The issue with cyclically adjusted numbers, however, is that they cannot
filter out all policy actions correlated with the cycle, such as discretionary measures adopted
in response to a contraction. Another challenge is to isolate the effects of fiscal policy
from other concurrent policy interventions, such as devaluations, monetary policy, or
labor market reforms, to mention just a few. Perotti (2013), too, in his analysis of large
fiscal consolidations stresses how critical other policy changes are. In order to overcome
these limitations, a novel approach, known as narrative identification, was proposed in the
context of fiscal policy by Romer and Romer (2010). Early narrative studies (see Barro
(1984); Barro and Redlick (2011); Ramey (2011b,a); Ramey and Shapiro (1998)) focused
on military spending buildup during wars, as this was not related to recessions most of
the time. However, some military spending may happen in anticipation of a war, thereby
affecting private spending before the war begins. Ramey (2011b) addressed this concern
using information from Business Week–what has then become known as “Ramey’s news
variable”–to isolate political announcements that led to increases in military spending.
Crucially, these estimates are limited to multipliers associated with military spending.
Therefore, it is not entirely clear to what extent they can be used to assess the value of
3See Ramey (2011b); Leeper et al. (2013) for a detailed discussion of this issue.
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multipliers in contexts unrelated to a war or a military buildup. Romer and Romer (2010)
went beyond the case of wars analyzing other episodes of exogenous shifts in fiscal variables,
namely changes in US federal taxes. The Romers define as exogenous all episodes of changes
in US federal taxes from 1947 to 2007 which were motivated by the aim of either improving
“long-run growth” or “reducing an inherited deficit”. The tax multipliers so estimated are
large4 and have attracted a lot of attention (see, for instance, Favero and Giavazzi (2012)).
Devries et al. (2011) have adopted this methodology to construct a time series–known as the
“IMF dataset”–of shifts in both taxes and spending for 17 OECD countries during the period
1978-2009. The episodes identified by these authors only include fiscal consolidations, that is,
the adjustments are solely motivated by the aim of reducing an inherited deficit. Guajardo
et al. (2014) have used this data set to estimate fiscal multipliers for the OECD countries
in the sample. Unlike the Romers, they assume that a fiscal measure affects output growth
only when it is implemented, while nothing happens at the time of the announcement.
Their main finding, consistent with earlier studies based on cyclically adjusted deficits, is
that tax-based adjustments are more contractionary than expenditure-based ones. Alesina
et al. (2015a) build on the fiscal consolidation episodes identified by Devries et al. (2011)
and propose a methodological innovation. They document that fiscal corrections occur in
multi-year plans, some are announced in advance whereas other are unexpected and often
revised in mid course. Ignoring these possibilities, that is, simulating the effects of isolated
one-time shifts in fiscal variables rather than plans, might result in biased estimates of the
effects of fiscal consolidation.
The exogeneity of fiscal policy measures identified on a narrative ground, as in Alesina
and coauthors (e.g., Alesina et al. (2015a,b, 2018b, 2017, 2018a)), has, however, been
challenged (e.g., Born et al. (2019)). These measures, the argument goes, are usually
implemented to reduce public debt or budget deficits, which tend to co-move systematically
with the sovereign default premium and with the business cycle. As a result, they are likely
endogenous with respect to default premia and may not be suited to identify the causal
effect of fiscal policy on the sovereign default premium.
4Over the course of three years an increase in taxes equivalent to 1% of GDP reduces output by 3%.
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3.2.3 Political economy
There is by now an extensive literature on fiscal policy and electoral results5. The
conventional wisdom suggests that governments tend to get reelected when they increase
deficits, because voters reward short-run benefits without internalizing the future costs
implied by the government’s budget constraint. Contrary to this belief, recent historical
evidence on the electoral effects of austerity shows that austerity does not systematically
lead to an electoral defeat. Using a sample of OECD countries, Alesina et al. (1998) find
that austerity has a weakly positive electoral effect, that is, governments that have reduced
deficits are more likely to be reelected. Alesina et al. (2013) analyze large multi-year fiscal
adjustments in OECD countries and “find no evidence that the turnover of governments
during those periods was significantly higher than the average of the entire sample” (page
532). In fact, they find some evidence that fiscally loose governments are more often
subject to electoral losses than average. These results are shown to be robust to alternative
specifications, time periods, and countries. Passarelli and Tabellini (2017) confirm that
neither small nor large fiscal adjustments are systematically associated with an electoral
defeat. They also find no conclusive evidence that only strong and popular governments6
were reelected after the implementation of fiscal consolidations. In another contribution on
the austerity effects on voting, Fetzer (2018) uses regional-level data on spending and voting
behavior, as well as individual-level survey data, to argue that the austerity policies in place
in the United Kingdom since 2010 have been a fundamental factor behind the Brexit vote.
Had austerity not happened, Leave support could have been at least 6 percentage points
lower.
3.2.4 Welfare and distributional effects
Fiscal adjustments are often very controversial, not least because of their direct dis-
tributional consequences. This holds for cuts in transfers and tax increases, but also for
spending cuts, to the extent that public goods are consumed to a different degree by
different constituencies or generations. Still, as they impact macroeconomic performance,
fiscal adjustments also have indirect distributional consequences–which may or may not
offset the direct effects. A key aspect in this regard is the effect of fiscal adjustments on
5See Alesina and Passalacqua (2016) for a comprehensive survey.
6The “strength” of a government is measured either in terms of its composition–for instance, it may be
formed by a coalition of parties–or in terms of stability–a dummy variable equal to 1 if the party has an
absolute majority in the house with lawmaking powers.
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unemployment. Another important aspect is that the short-run and long-run effects of fiscal
adjustments may differ. Coenen et al. (2008), for instance, find that fiscal consolidation
gives rise to sizable short-run adjustment costs, but has positive long-run effects on key
macro variables such as output and consumption (see also Born et al. (2019)). Given
the (immediate) distributional implications, specific preferences of a given society play
a pivotal role in determining the appropriate composition of austerity measures (Mu¨ller
(2014a)). To date, only a few studies have looked at the distributional effects of fiscal
consolidation. These studies suggest that austerity measures are generally associated
with an increase in poverty and an increase in income inequality. Mulas-Granados (2005)
examines a sample of 53 adjustment episodes occurred in the fifteen EU Member States
between 1960-2000 and shows that expenditure-based adjustments may be expansionary
under specific circumstances, albeit at the expense of higher income inequality, whereas
the opposite is true for revenue-based adjustments. Using a sample of 17 OECD countries
over the period 1978–2009, Ball et al. (2013) find that fiscal consolidations tend to raise
inequality and long-term unemployment. Furthermore, spending-based adjustments are
found to have larger inequality effects than tax-based adjustments. Agnello and Sousa
(2014) analyze a panel of 18 industrialized countries and find that, while spending-based
consolidation seems to be detrimental for income distribution, tax increases seem to have
an equalizing effect. Woo et al. (2017) show that the composition of consolidation measures
also matters: progressive taxation and targeted social benefits can help offset some of the
adverse distributional effects of consolidation. In conclusion, the literature on welfare and
distributional effects of fiscal consolidation is still at an early stage; therefore, more research
is needed to attain a more comprehensive understanding of austerity.
3.3 Private-sector deleveraging
3.3.1 Macroeconomic performance
As “private-sector deleveraging” I define efforts by the private sector to reduce borrowing
levels. Such efforts may be a result of deliberate decisions by borrowers in light of reduced
net worth, less benign or less certain income prospects. It may also be imposed by lenders
which seek to repair their own balance sheets. Importantly, just like in case of public
deleveraging, such efforts may fail to lower the level of debt relative to current GDP in
the short run because of their contractionary effect on economic activity. In a series of
influential papers, Atif R. Mian and Amir Sufi have illustrated the importance of both the
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build-up of private-sector debts prior to the crisis, as well as the severe consequences of
private-sector deleveraging. Notably, they make use of zip-code data to identify the effects
of private-sector deleveraging, without relying on a fully-specified model. A benefit of such
an approach is that one can limit the number of restrictive assumptions. Mian et al. (2013)
and Mian and Sufi (2014a,b, 2016) present evidence for the United States and, in particular,
its counties. They document both the dramatic increase of household debt between 2000
and 2007 and the severe consequences of the house price collapse for consumption and
employment after 2007. More specifically, they find that household leverage is a powerful
predictor of the ensuing recession and that the response of consumption to a drop in asset
prices depends on the extent of leverage. Mian and Sufi (2016) document similar effects
for an unbalanced panel of 30 countries and data for 1960–2012. Similarly, Jauch and
Watzka (2012) find that the level of household-sector debt in Spanish provinces in 2007
predicts changes in aggregate demand and accounts for about one third of the increase of
unemployment between 2007 and 2010. At a more general level, Schularick and Taylor
(2012) document that financial crises are preceded by excessive growth of private debt made
possible by failures in the operation and/or regulation of the financial system.
3.3.2 Borrowing constraints
Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) present a tractable modeling framework to study the
macroeconomic implications of private-sector deleveraging. A key result of their analysis
is that a large deleveraging shock pushes an economy to the zero lower bound. In their
framework, a fraction of households is impatient and borrowing-constrained. Deleveraging
results from an exogenous tightening of the borrowing constraint. In the event, natural
interest rates may fall so much that monetary policy becomes constrained by the zero lower
bound and the economy enters a severe recession. Benigno et al. (2016b) develop a model
with richer dynamics. Dynamic deleveraging is shown to amplify the effect of monetary
policy at the zero lower bound as it directly affects the natural rate of interest. In open
economies there are additional complications of the deleveraging process. Benigno and Romei
(2014) examine the international implications of debt deleveraging in one country and study
the spillovers onto the world economy through trade and the exchange rate. The adjustment
to the deleveraging shock requires movements in the exchange rate and the real interest
rate. The former rebalances resources across countries. The latter’s movements depend on
home bias in consumers’ preferences. Fornaro (2018) analyzes deleveraging countries which
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operate within a currency union and finds that the impossibility of depreciating the currency
amplifies the fall in consumption and the downward pressure on the interest rate. As a
result, deleveraging can lead to a liquidity trap and an aggregate recession. In related work,
Kuvshinov et al. (2016) build on this literature, but, rather than assuming that an entire
economy deleverages, they assume that there are borrowing-constrained and unconstrained
households within a country. They further assume that wages are downwardly rigid as
in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2016) and that the economy operates within a currency
union. They find that the deleveraging shock lowers domestic output strongly. Yet, the real
exchange rate may fail to depreciate if there are sizable inflation spillovers to the rest of
the union. This, in turn, depends on the size of the crisis country relative to the rest of
the union. As stressed above, private-sector deleveraging may be the result of a reduction
of credit supply, but also of a reduction of credit demand. A reduction of credit demand
is likely to result if households’ net worth collapses or if income and/or employment risk
increase and households expect to be borrowing-constrained in some states of the world.
In this case, the desire to raise precautionary savings becomes a severe drag on aggregate
demand. Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017) study a tightening of borrowing constraints in an
heterogeneous-agent incomplete-market model. As a result, in their analysis credit demand
declines in addition to the reduction of credit supply. They find a negative impact on
interest rates and output even if prices are flexible, although the output drop is larger with
sticky prices. Similarly, the analysis of Jones et al. (2011) features both credit supply and
credit demand effects. They find that deleveraging alone cannot account for the large drop
in unemployment in the United States. Still, in the presence of other shocks, as a result of
which the zero lower bound becomes binding, deleveraging intensifies and accounts for about
half of the decline in employment. Justiniano et al. (2015) explore the role of borrowing
constraints jointly with house prices. They find that the credit cycle in the United States
cannot be accounted for by exogenous shifts in credit availability but was more likely driven
by factors that affected house prices more directly. However, they also point out that the
macroeconomic consequences of the leveraging cycle are relatively minor within the class of
dynamic general equilibrium models they consider, since the responses of borrowers and
lenders wash out in the aggregate.
There is by now a nascent literature which explores the interaction of borrowing
constraints and uncertainty and documents sizable effects. Bayer et al. (2019) quantify
the aggregate consequences of precautionary savings and portfolio adjustments in response
to shocks to household income risk in a model with two types of assets. Higher income
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risk leads to increasing precautionary savings and to a portfolio rebalancing toward the
liquid asset, as it provides better short-run consumption smoothing. Challe and Ragot
(2016) analyze the macroeconomic implications of time-varying precautionary saving over
the business cycle in a model featuring both aggregate and idiosyncratic labor income
shocks. Due to imperfect insurance against unemployment risk, households respond by
adjusting their buffer stock of wealth, which, in turn, amplifies the consumption response
to aggregate shocks that affect unemployment. In Den Haan et al. (2018), the interaction
of borrowing constraints and sticky nominal wages is shown to amplify the business cycle
through precautionary savings. Gornemann et al. (2016) show that in a heterogenous-agent
New Keynesian (HANK) model featuring incomplete asset markets households are impacted
differently by economic downturns depending on their wealth and other characteristics.
Ravn and Sterk (2016) incorporate search and matching frictions in a HANK model and
derive tractable results making the assumptions of limited participation in the equity
market combined with a borrowing constraint in the bond market. Notably, they address
potential equilibrium multiplicity which may be overlooked when solving incomplete markets
numerically. In a similar setup, Ravn and Sterk (2017) study the effect of an exogenous
increase in job uncertainty. They show that shocks impacting on future job prospects can
be amplified significantly by a number of frictions, such as asset market incompleteness.
A relevant strand of literature is concerned with overborrowing in open economies
featuring a collateral constraint linked to market prices. This type of collateral constraint
gives rise to a pecuniary externality because the price of the object pledged as collateral
is taken as given by individual agents but is endogenous in equilibrium. As a result, the
economy in normal times borrows more than it would if agents internalized the externality
(see, for instance, Bianchi (2011), Bianchi et al. (2016), Jeanne and Korinek (forthcoming),
and Bianchi and Mendoza (2018) on optimal time consistent macroprudential policy). In
contrast to the overborrowing result, Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2019) formally establish
that, under plausible parametrizations, the same class of models may feature excessive
precautionary saving as a way to self-insure against self-fulfilling crises, which ultimately
leads to underborrowing. This result emerges because the collateral constraint model can
generate non-convexities in the equilibrium resource constraint, thus giving rise to multiple
equilibria, as suggested heuristically by Jeanne and Korinek (forthcoming) and Benigno et
al. (2016a) in the context of an economy featuring a stock collateral constraint and a flow
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Table 3.2: Selected findings on private deleveraging
Study Type of study Main result
Bianchi (2011) Theoretical
Quantitative
Pecuniary externality generates overborrowing
in a DE; SP accumulates sufficiently large pre-
cautionary savings to make large reversals in
capital flows a much lower probability event
Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) Theoretical
Quantitative
Large deleveraging shock pushes an economy
to the ZLB and causes a severe recession
Schularick and Taylor (2012) Empirical Financial crises are preceded by excessive
growth of private debt; smaller deleveraging in
crisis episodes in the second half of the twenti-
eth century
Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017) Theoretical
Quantitative
Deleveraging causes output drop even with
flexible prices but effect is stronger with sticky
prices
Mian et al. (2013); Mian and Sufi (2014a,b) Theoretical
Empirical
Response of consumption to asset price drop
depends on the extent of leverage
collateral constraint, respectively7.
Table 3.2 summarizes the major findings on private deleveraging discussed above.
3.4 The interaction
A further layer of complexity emerges when studying public and private deleveraging
jointly and, specifically, the nonlinear effects arising from their joint occurrence. Public-
sector deleveraging, as it triggers a recession and raises the level of unemployment, increases
unemployment risk and thus induces an increase in precautionary savings. Private deleverag-
ing, in turn, responds endogenously to public deleveraging as a consequence of lower income
being available as collateral (see, for instance, Bianchi et al. (2018)). These features call for a
(global) solution of the model under uncertainty while considering occasionally binding con-
straints and allowing for uncertainty as an amplification mechanism. In a linearized model
setup, interaction effects may be captured to the extent that one compares model dynamics
across steady states, which differ in the level of private or public indebtedness. Yet, there
are additional interaction effects. For instance, as private and public sector deleveraging
are both potentially deflationary, a joint deleveraging effort is likely to have more adverse
effects than just the sum of the effects of each effort in isolation. Certainty equivalence
rules out precautionary saving motives, which imply that the borrowing constraint is not
necessarily binding in the stochastic steady state. Therefore, linear approximation methods
(see Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015)) are not able to capture precautionary behavior due to
7Ad-hoc calibrations, as in Bianchi (2011) and Ottonello (2015), rule out multiplicity.
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the possibility that the constraint may become binding in the future as a result of shocks
yet unrealized.8
Evidence on how public and private deleveraging interact in shaping macroeconomic
outcomes is to date still limited. My second chapter assesses how the interaction of these
factors contributed to the output contraction in Greece over the 2010-14 period. Baldacci
et al. (2015) conduct an empirical analysis of the effects of fiscal consolidations during
periods of private deleveraging. Their sample covers 107 countries and 79 episodes of
public debt reduction during the period 1980 to 2012. They find that expenditure-based,
front-loaded fiscal adjustments reduce growth, whereas gradual fiscal adjustments that rely
on a mix of revenue and expenditure measures can support output growth and reduce
public debt. Klein (2017), in another empirical analysis, finds that the costs of fiscal
consolidations depend on the level of private indebtedness: they are high when private
debt is high and low (or non-existent) when private debt is low. Klein and Winkler (2018),
in turn, find that austerity leads to a strong and persistent increase in income inequality,
but only during periods of private debt overhang. Unlike the previous studies, which do
not make a distinction with respect to the initial level of inequality, Brinca et al. (2016)
stress its relevance and document a strong correlation between wealth inequality and the
magnitude of fiscal multipliers. They establish that the fiscal multiplier is highly sensitive
to the fraction of population facing borrowing constraints and negatively related to the
average wealth level in the economy. A model-based analysis by Batini et al. (2015) also
illustrates how private and public deleveraging may interact. Specifically, they consider a
temporary negative house-price shock that reduces the market value of constrained agents’
collateral. Private borrowers respond to the tightening of the borrowing constraint by
cutting consumption and investment, thus reducing output and government tax revenues.
In the event, the government faces a higher debt-to-GDP ratio, which in turn raises the
sovereign risk premium and its financing costs. Andre´s et al. (2016) study a small open
economy which operates in a currency union and analyze the role of the size, timing,
and composition of fiscal consolidations and how these factors interact with private-sector
deleveraging. They solve the model under perfect foresight and find that medium-run
multipliers, in particular, increase with the size of the consolidation and make the private
deleveraging phase longer and deeper. In terms of composition, consolidation programs
based on spending cuts or capital tax hikes are found to have particularly adverse effects
8At a more general level, local approximation is not well suited in the presence of occasionally binding
constraints because it fails to deal with points of non-differentiability.
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as they extend the private deleveraging phase. The authors also contrast the welfare
effects of alternative consolidation strategies, but in doing so they assume that income risk
due to unemployment spells is insured across households. Martin and Philippon (2017)
quantify the importance of various factors for the crisis dynamics in the euro area–including
private-sector deleveraging and fiscal policy. They rely on a linear semistructural model
which combines a basic New Keynesian framework with ad-hoc rules for fiscal policy and
private-sector deleveraging. A key result of their analysis is that, had fiscal policy been less
expansionary in the build up to the crisis, there would have been less need for austerity
during the crisis–given the assumed fiscal rule. They also stress that macroprudential
policies interact with fiscal policies: if tighter macroprudential policies had limited the
build-up of private debts, fiscal policy–again under their assumed rule–would have been
more expansionary and hence would have undone some of the effect on overall indebtedness.
3.5 Concluding remarks
How strong is the interaction of public and private deleveraging? To date, there is still
limited evidence about their joint effects, so a definitive answer is not yet possible. In line
with previous studies on the individual effects of private and public deleveraging, the timing
and composition of fiscal adjustment as well as the (initial) level of private indebtedness
seem to be determining factors. This is certainly an interesting area of research, particularly
in view of the recent experience of the euro area. The amplification mechanism stemming
from the joint occurrence of private and public deleveraging shocks is likely a great force
behind the dismal macroeconomic performance of peripheral countries during the Great
Contraction. A quantitative assessment of these effects on a country-by-country basis for
the periphery of the euro area is, however, still missing. This analysis is required 1) to
establish whether the fiscal consolidation measures implemented over the years 2009-13
were the main culprit for the recessions experienced by those countries, 2) to test the
alternative hypothesis that the macroeconomic performance was to a larger extent the
result of private-sector deleveraging, and ultimately 3) to assess the quantitative relevance
of joint deleveraging efforts.
3.5. Concluding remarks
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